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I t  was through a retreating rabble of disorganised 
infantry, who had flung away r i f l e s  and a l l  m ilitary  
accoutrements in their r e t i r a l ,  that the B rit ish  
Troops, early in November 1917, marched up to the 
forward area on the Ita lian  front.
To anyone not acquainted with a l l  the circum­
stances of the case, and particu larly  i f  one is  ignor­
ant o f the Ita lian  temperament, the retreat of the 
I ta lian  Army, which started from the sector round the 
l i t t l e  Alpine v i l la ge  of Caporetto on 24th October 
1917, is  well-nigh inexplicable. A l l  the more so i f  
one knew what prodigies of valour they had accomplish­
ed since their entry into the World War on 24th May 
1915 -  their f in a l war of the "Risorgimento" with a l l  
i t  meant to the Ita lian  idea list  longing fo r the f u l ­
filment of Gariba ld i’ s dream o f " I t a l i a  Redenta" -  
Ita ly  Redeemed.
In their f i r s t  rush a fter  declaring war, the 
Ita lians had carried their 300 mile front o f high 
Alps into Austrian territory . Monte Sabatino, an 
almost impregnable mountain, together with a devast­
ating outbreak of Cholera (14,000 cases with a mort­
a l ity  of 46$) delayed the capture of Gorizia until 
August 1916 by an offensive on a gigantic scale on 
the/
I N T R O D U C T I O N .
the Isonzo and Carso on terrain whose immense d i f f i ­
culties must be seen to be believed. The Car30 in 
particu lar, a vast limestone table land in which 
trenches had to be blasted, without shade or shelter 
and practically  waterless, was a f i t  scene for war­
fare such as only a Dante could conceive.
And yet step by step on the Carso and Isonzo and 
the Higher Alps, the Ita lian  advance forged slowly on 
though at te rr ib le  cost, with Trieste as the objective.
Further great offensives from Plava and Gorizia 
during May to September in 1917 with victories at 
Monte Kuk, Monte Santo, San Gabriele and on the 
Bainsizza plateau, saw the Ita lians reach the high- 
water mark of their successes.
And then this wonderful army which had done im­
possibly brave things, performed engineering and 
mountaineering feats almost incredible, suddenly 
collapsed. The depths of the Caporetto disaster were 
possible only because the Ita lian  Army was capable of 
such wonderful heights.
Over two years had been spent in the trenches 
amid incredible hardships and dangers: sk ilfu l d i f ­
fusion o f enemy propaganda acted with volcanic effect  
on vo lat ile  temperaments already further depressed by 
news of the hardships endured by the women and children 
at home* To crown a l l  the sector at Caporetto was 
held by regiments which had shortly before received 
large/
large drafts of disaffected pac ifis t  strikers from the 
commercial c it ies  of central Ita ly .
The m ilitary genius of Ludendorff chose the 
psychological place and time, and thus i t  was that in 
November 1917 French and B rit ish  troops, hastily  with­
drawn from the western front, found themselves marching 
up to the Ita lian  front through retreating troops who 
had shed the la st  vestige of their morale.
The Caporetto disaster and a l l  that followed dis­
organised not only the fighting portion of the Ita lian  
Army, but a l l  the administrative services as well,  
including o f course the medical service.
Large numbers o f hospitals with a l l  their equip­
ment and innumerable medical o fficers  with their  
sta ffs  were captured or lost during those dark days; 
and when the reorganisation of the Ita lian  Army took 
place, this loss both of personnel and material was 
d if f ic u lt  to replace.
More c iv i lian  practitioners had to be called up 
to replace these numerous casualties and this un­
doubtedly affected adversely the c iv ilian  population 
who were le f t  with an insuffic ient number of over­
worked doctors.
Add to this the tremendous congestion in the 
Zona di Guerra caused by the presence not only o f most 
of the orig inal poorer inhabitants, but of considerable 
numbers/
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numbers of refugees from the oooupied territory , and 
the presence too of vast numbers of troops -  Ita lian ,  
French and B rit ish  -  and the wonder is  that the in ­
cidence of epidemic disease was not in f in ite ly  greater 
than i t  turned out to be.
5.
THE BRITISH TROOPS IN ITALY.
During the c r it ic a l  days at the end of 1917 and 
beginning of 191% when the poss ib ility  o f a further 
Austrian break through by the valleys of the Astico 
or Brenta was an ever-present danger, General Sir  
Herbert Plumer was Commander-in-Chief of the B rit ish  
Forces which consisted of five  Divisions. Three of  
these Divisions were located on the Montello, a 
rounded oblong h i l l  forming part of the foo th ills  of 
the Alps, which was the hinge of the Ita lian  front 
between the mountains and the sea. The other two 
divisions were in reserve in the neighbourhood o f  
Cittadella in the Province o f Padua.
By the spring of 1918 the position was consoli­
dated, Ita lian  morale was restored, the Austrians were 
palpably contained, and the pressing needs of the 
Western front compelled a withdrawal of two of our 
Divisions (the 5th and 41st). The remaining three 
Divisions (7th, 23rd and 48th) came under the command 
of General Lord Cavan.
With the advent of good weather the B rit ish  troops 
were relieved on the Montello by Italians^ and took 
over a mountain sector on the Asiago Plateau where 
they, together with two French Divisions and a varying 
number of I ta lian  Divisions, formed the Sixth Ita lian  
Army/
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Army under General Montuori. While holding this front 
two divisions were in line on the Plateau and one 
division was held in reserve on the plains -  the whole 
area being in the Province of Vicenza.
During the early summer this sector was quiet, 
but on June 15th after an intensive bombardment,the 
Austrians attempted their la st  great offensive in 
conjunction with the German offensive on the Western 
front. The attack was completely repulsed a fter  hard 
fighting and i t  was then generally considered that 
Austria had shot her bo lt .
Meanwhile, during the whole summer the reorganisa­
tion of Ita ly  -  her armies at the front and her c iv i l ­
ian population at home -  had steadily and miraculously 
progressed, and the repulse of the Austrian attack in 
June put the fin ishing touches to the process o f re ­
storing the nation’ s morale, a process which had been 
steadily fostered since Caperetto. The plans elab­
orated by Ita lian  Commando Supremo were gradually 
completed and culminated in the fin a l victorious 
offensive, the battle of V ittorio  Veneto, which ended 
in the complete defeat of the whole Austrian Army.
In pursuance o f this plan one of the British
f
Divisions, the 48th, was le f t  in line on the Plateau 
and took part in the f in a l advance there.
The/
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The 7th and 23rd Divisions were moved secretly to 
the Piave, and,as part o f the Tenth Ita lian  Army,
command of which devolved on Lord Cavan, took a big
*\
share in the f in a l decisive battle  which was launched 
on 24th October and ended in Austria suing fo r  an 
Armistice on 4th November.
8.
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THE BRITISH TROOPS ITT ITALY.
The troops on a rr iva l in November 1917 were 
mostly detrained in the area between Mantua and Padua 
and marched thence by stages to the f i r s t  B ritish  
sector -  the Montello area -  where we had the French 
on our le f t .  This sector was a llotted  to us not only 
because of its  tactica l importance, but also because, 
as snow was imminent, i t  was considered by Ita lian  
Commando Supremo that our troops would not be able to 
stand the severe winter conditions in the Alpine 
sectors, being unaccustomed to such warfare and being 
without the special mountain equipment necessary.
This Montello sector was a distinct feature by 
i t s e l f  of the Ita lian  front -  a long low hog-backed 
h i l l  acting as a hinge to the whole Ita lian  line and 
linking up that portion which faced north from Mt. 
Tomba to Lake Garda with the defensive line of the 
river Piave which protected Venice. This sector we 
took over on 4th December 1917 and held until March 
18th 1918. During that period there was no severe 
fighting -  the Piave r iver  having a breadth at this 
point of over a thousand yards and a current of 
14- knots -  but continuous patrol work was carried out 
and various lines of defence were organised. 
Casualties were re la t ive ly  few and the health of the 
troops was excellent.
It/
I t  was decided that B rit ish  Troops should hold 
some portion of the mountain front during the summer 
months, and the exact portion taken over was on the 
Asiago Plateau (3000 to 4000 fe e t ) .  This area was 
occupied by us by March 29th and though not a real 
"Alpine" sector in comparison with a great portion of 
the Ita lian  front, s t i l l  i t  was high enough and pre­
cipitous enough to necessitate the conversion of  
transport and equipment to a mountain establishment.
As we only held a few miles of the depth of the 
plateau -  the remainder o f i t  and the high mountains 
beyond being in Austrian hands -  only the troops in 
line  were on the Plateau and those in reserve were 
scattered about in various areas in the Province of 
Vicenza in the plains.
Whilst holding this sector complete mastery of 
"No-man's land" was obtained and retained by us by 
means of continual raids, and casualties were corres­
pondingly few. On June 15th the Austrian offensive  
took place but was completely repulsed.
As fa r  as health was concerned the summer of 1918 
was luckily for us not abnormally hot for Ita ly , but 
the troops in reserve on the plains undoubtedly fe lt  
the unaccustomed heat with results which w i l l  be 
brought out la ter  in the survey o f Diarrhoeal Diseases.




Divisions which had been moved secretly to the Piave, 
took over part of the front there from Salletuol to 
Palazzon and took part in the f in a l grand offensive. 
This was a malarial area as w i l l  he referred to la te r .
Our lines of communication were of necessity very 
much spread out, the most important aggregations of  
troops being at Tortona, Voghera, Cremona and Genoa.
In addition to this there were various places on the 
Mediterranean L. of 0. under our administration, the 
most important being Taranto.
11.
MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH FORCES IN ITALY.
The Medical Arrangements may be most conveniently 
considered under the headings of (a ) Forward Area,
(b ) Lines of Communication and (c ) Base.
A. FORWARD AREA.
I .  Regimental Medical O fficers .
Each battalion o f infantry, brigade of 
a r t i l le ry ,  or equivalent formation, has one med­
ica l o f f ic e r  attached to the unit headquarters 
who moves with the unit and, i f  he is  a good and 
zealous o ff ic e r ,  becomes in fact an integral and 
exceedingly important part of that unit. Under 
him are the regimental stretcher-bearers (normally 
the bandsmen) who have a certain amount of train -  
ing in f i r s t -a id ,  etc. He forms a Regimental Aid 
Post while the unit is  in action,and a Sick-room 
when out of the line .
I I .  Field Ambulance.
Each Division has, as part of its  establish­
ment, three Field Ambulances -  one for each Brigade. 
The War Establishment of each of these consists of 
10 o fficers  and 182 other ranks of the R.A.M.C. 
There are also attached 52 other ranks o f the 
R.A.S.C. (Horse transport and motor transport).
For the transport o f sick and wounded each Field  
Ambulance/
Ambulance has three horse-drawn ambulance wagons 
and seven motor ambulances.
A fa i r ly  comprehensive medical and surgical 
equipment is  carried, and impromptu hospital accom­
modation can be rapidly improvised by these mobile 
units, either in the tents which are carried or, 
as is  more usually the case, in buildings taken 
over for the purpose.
As a general rule one Field Ambulance,or 
Section thereof, is  set aside fo r  the reception of
■vm
a l l  cases of Infectious Disease.
In action the Field Ambulances form Relay 
Posts fo r hand-carriage by stretcher to the rear 
of casualties; Collecting Posts for the marshal­
ling  of walking casualties; Advanced Dressing 
Stations and Main Divisional Dressing Stations.
Except during very active operations, one 
Field Ambulance or section thereof is  also usually  
detailed to form a Divisional Rest Station for the 
rest and recuperation of "petits  malades” .
I I I .  Casualty Clearing Stations.
From the Divisional Dressing Stations cases 
are removed by ambulance to the Casualty Clearing 
Stations,which are hospitals o f more permanent 
nature where a l l  immediate operations are per­
formed prior to evacuation to the Base.
These/
These are a llotted  usually in the ratio of 
one per division employed.
As with Field Ambulances, one C.C.S. or portion 
thereof is  set aside sole ly  for the reception of 
"Special'* cases, in which are included a l l  Infec­
tious or Contagious Diseases usually mated 
ignominiousljr i t  must be confessed, with Venereal 
Diseases and S e lf - in f l ic te d  Wounds.
IV. Advanced Depot o f Medical Stores.
This as its  name implies, is  simply a dump 
from which a l l  medical units in the forward area 
draw medical stores on indent.
B. LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
Under this head we may include Ambulance 
Trains in which cases are transported from the 
Casualty Clearing Stations to the Base.
But in Ita ly  also, in view o f the scattered 
nature of our L. of C., we posted (at Cremona) 
a Stationary Hospital fo r the reception of milder 
cases like ly  to recover quickly and be f i t  for  
duty, and also for the reception of very serious 
cases unable to undertake the long journey to the 
Base without a break.
From the tactical point of view also, in thi3 
case i t  was considered advisable to open a large  
hospital/
hospital on the L. of C. inasmuch as, in the event 
o f a break through by the enemy, the wounded could 
at a pinch be transported direct to Cremona by 
motor ambulance convoy.
C. BASE.
At the Base are General Hospitals and Station­
ary Hospitals.
The Base hospitals for the Ita lian  front were 
located at Genoa and at Bordighera on the Ligurian  
Riviera,where also we formed Convalescent Depots 
fo r  both o ffice rs  and men.
A ll  the buildings we took over were excellent 
for the purpose, mostly large and luxurious hotels 
in fact; and the climate and surroundings were 
alike conducive to rapid recovery




In addition to a l l  those purely medical 
units, there were Mobile Laboratories both Bacterio­
logica l and Hygienic, and one of these was always 
posted at the Casualty Clearing Station or Hospital 
set aside for the reception of Infectious Diseases. 
Another most important link in the prevention and 
investigation o f notifiab le  diseases was the 
Sanitary Section which I think requires explanation 
in greater deta il.
15.
At the beginning o f the War, the Sanitary Section 
as la id  down in War Establishments consisted of one 
Medical O fficer in charge and 25 other ranks trained 
in Sanitary Work.
Until the la tte r  end of 1916, a Sanitary Section 
wa3 a llotted  to each Division, moved with the Div­
ision, and exercised functions in part supervisory 
but al3o largely  p ractical, inasmuch as they actually  
constructed most la tr ines , u rinals , incinerators etc. 
of anything like a permanent nature fo r  their Division.
In the more or less stationary trench warfare on 
the Western front during 1915 -  16 i t  was found that 
this system led to a great deal o f over-lapping and 
lack of co-ordination,as a Division, on moving, 
usually attempted to move with i t  a considerable pro­
portion of the f it t in gs  constructed by its  Sanitary 
Section. As one Division only moved to be replaced 
by another, the incoming units found a more or less  
complete lack of sanitary f it t in gs  and i f  any did 
exist they probably did not conform to the type the 
new Division was accustomed to. The result was that 
new fit t in gs  of an in fin ite  variety of types were 
constantly being made and scrapped as Division suc­
ceeded Division in any particular area.




made from G.H.Q. France, that Sanitary Sections should 
become Area Troops -  he permanently settled in a 
definite sector which they continually patrolled, and 
co-ordinate the sanitary work o f each new incoming 
unit as i t  moved into their area.
The XVth Army Corps on the Somme, o f which I was
D.A.D.M.S. at the time, was I believe the f i r s t  forma­
tion to adopt and carry out this scheme, and we found
it  a great advance on the older method,, although we 
always made the proviso that in the event of open war­
fare occurring again we would at once post a Sanitary 
Section to each Division fo r  any b ig  advance.
About this time too, owing to the shortage of  
medical o ff ice rs , the majority of those in command of 
Sanitary Sections were withdrawn and their places 
taken by o fficers  who, though not medical men, were 
given temporary commissions in the R.A.M.C.
These o fficers  were drawn from a variety of pro­
fessions and trades but the only time one regretted  
that they were not medical men was during an epidemic, 
particularly  i f  such occurred amongst the c iv ilians  
of their area. But even then they quickly learned to 
undertake investigations and the inspectional and 
disinfecting duties generally which are usually  
relegated to a Sanitary Inspector in this country.
Each Sanitary Section maintained a workshop where 
models of a l l  Field Sanitary appliances were kept on 
show,/
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show, and to which fighting units could send their  
pioneer personnel for instruction and help in making 
the required art ic les  for the unit.
Their personnel continually patrolled and in­
spected the whole area for the discovery of nuisances 
and for the purpose of advising incoming units as to 
the sanitary arrangements of the area.
They periodically  tested and labelled  a l l  sources 
of water supply in their area.
The Sanitary Section also supervised or carried  
out disinfection a fter  cases of infectious disease 
among troops or c iv ilians.
In short they were most important units in com­
bating disease, and i t  was on the Ita lian  front particu­
la rly  in my own experience, that we found them of very 
great value.
NOTIFICATION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE.
A ll  cases of infectious or communicable disease 
were notified  at once by the Medical O fficer in charge 
to the principal administrative medical o f f ic e r  of the 
formation concerned.
Following that thi3 pro forma was f i l l e d  up in 
a l l  cases and dispatched as soon as possible.
18.
a l l  in f e c t io u s  d is e a s e s .
1. Disease .........................................
Name ............  R ank ............  No.......... Age ...
Unit ...............  Coy.............  P la t o o n ............
Division . . . . .  Corps..........
2. Date of Arrival in Country ........................
5. Date reporting sick ....................................
4. Place reporting sick ..................................
5. Probable place of Infection .......................
6. Suspected source of Infection ...................
(e .g . Milk, water, f l i e s ,  carriers , prevalence 
of sickness among c iv ilian s , e t c . )
7. Date last  inoculated T.A.B...........  Evidence ..........
(Documentary 
or verba l)
Remarks ........... ..................... .......................
(Description and map reference of b i l l e t  
last occupied e t c . )
Signature
Date   .........
M.O. x/c.
As mentioned above, one Fie ld  Ambulance, or more 
usually a section of Field Ambulance, was set aside 
for the reception of such cases; also a special O.G.S. 
and a special Base Hospital or portions thereof.
Almost immediately on our a rr iva l in Italy, i t  
became obvious that in view o f the congested state of 
the Zona di Guerra, packed as i t  was with refugees 
and troops (Ita lian , French and B rit ish ) in addition 
to approximately its  own normal population, some 
system of inter-notification  of infectious disease 
was essential. More particu larly  did we consider 
this so with regard to the c iv i lian  population,in­
asmuch as diseases of the Enteric group and Dysentery 
are endemic in North Ita ly .
Accordingly a comparatively complete system of 
inter-notification was instituted between ourselves 
and the Ita lian  and French troops and also the c iv ilian s .  
I say 'comparatively1 advisedly because, owing to the 
backward state of education in matters of hygiene and 
sanitation among the c iv i lian  population of North 
Ita ly , and also one must admit partly due to the 
paucity of c iv i l ian  medical practitioners, there is  
no doubt whatever that the figures I shall quote later  
for the Ita lian  c iv ilian  population are a gross under­
estimate.
However, be that as i t  may, the figures are as 
complete as i t  was possible to obtain, and that they 
are even so complete is  a tribute to the harmonious 
working of the A ll ie s  in the f ie ld  of preventive 
medicine.
*
Twice or thrice a week we received from the Ita lian  
medical/
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medical authorities bulletins giving name, age, address 
and diagnosis of a l l  cases of notifiab le  disease in 
the Province* These bulletins were immediately rapidly  
duplicated and copies were sent to a l l  administrative 
medical o fficers  of formations and to a l l  o fficers  
commanding Sanitary Sections. The Officers command­
ing Sanitary Sections at once visited a l l  cases in 
their particular area and sent in reports on each 
case stating the proximity of British  troops to the 
infected house, etc.
Naturally a considerable proportion of the cases 
among civ ilians were not like ly  to affect our troops, 
but a l l  cases in our b i l le t in g  areas were gone into 
carefully and every effort was made to discover the 
source of infection.
As Ita lian  c iv ilian  hospital accommodation was 
greatly over-taxed and often non-existent, and because 
their education in sanitary standards was not always 
quite as advanced as ours, one could not always ensure 
removal of the danger focus to hospital: but what 
pressure one could command was brought to bear in 
trying to obtain hospitalisation.
When the patient had any connection with a shop 
or with the sale of milk, f ru it ,  sweets etc., the 
premises were at once declared "Out of Bounds to a l l  
British Troops" -  a large supply of printed tickets 
being issued to Sanitary Sections for the purpose of 
affix ing/
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affix ing to the premises and-its approaches. I f  
British Troops were b i l le ted  on the premises they were 
of course at once given accommodation elsewhere.
In short, every possible step was taken to prevent 
as fa r as possible the infection of our Troops from 
such c iv ilian  foc i.
The figures which follow w ill, I think, demonstrate 
how admirably and e ffic ien tly  wise and watchful ad­
ministration prevented the spread of disease under 
conditions which were well-nigh ideal for rapid dis­
semination of infection.
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS.
I propose to take up each disease separately 
as fa r  as possible -  prefacing any remarks made on 
the condition as applicable to our Troops by a table 
or tables showing the relative incidence of such 
condition on the A llied  Troops and the civilians in 
the area.
But before proceeding to take up each disease 
separately, I append tables showing for each month 
the incidence of a l l  notifiab le  diseases in the various 
formations under review, v iz . -  
Table I ./
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Table I .  Infectious Diseases -  Admissions -
British  Force in Italy- 
Forward Area.
Table I I .  Infectious Diseases -  Admissions -
British  Zone in Ita ly  
Base and L. of 0.
Table I I I .  Infectious Diseases -  Admissions -
Taranto.
Table IV. Infectious Diseases -  Admissions -
Sixth Ita lian  Army.
Table V. Infectious Diseases -  Admissions -
French Army in Ita ly .
Table VI. Infectious Diseases -  Notifications -
Province of Vicenza.
Table V II. Infectious Diseases -  Notifications -
Kingdom of Ita ly .
The most complete figures are, naturally, those 
of our own Army. Some of the conditions are either 
not notifiab le  in the other formations concerned in 
this survey, or else, i f  notifiab le , were not pro­
curable.
23.
BRITISH FORCE IN... I TALY : FORWARD AREA.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES -  ADMISSIONS DEO. 1qt7_-_DEC. 1918 (INCLUSIVE). 
1917. 19 IS.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. 0 c t . Nov. Dec. To tal s
Average Strength 102,183 113,759 113,233 93,050 71,193 71,642 68,707 67,547 67,500 65,286 63,284 62,623 60,192 78,477 (Mear
Measles 6 5 8 5 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 27
Rubella 0 0 4 6 4 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 25
Chickenpox 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Smallpox 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cerebro-Spinal 
Fever 0 0 4
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Typhus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 1" 0 0 6 “ID ' 7 11 2 37
“512 4 4 2 0 9 10 5 10 3 2 0 0
Anthrax 0 0 0 O' 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Erysipelas 1 3 4 2 1 0 0 2 0 4 1 0 3 21
Tetanus 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3
Trachoma 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Malta Fever 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Spirochaetosis 
Ictero-Haemorrhaglca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1
Diphtheria 4 12 18 11 15 10 3 30 20 5 6 3 4 141
Scarlatina 7 22 9 7 5 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 58
Typhoid Group 0 21 14 5 1 6 5 5 10 31 18 2 16 134
Dysentery 3 7 5 7 1 2 9 63 256 321 150 28 7 859
Influenza 100 40 19 102 2 193 4553 145 131 338 3547 1730 614 11,514
Tuberculosis 
(Pulmonary) 6 16 9 7 7 5 10 4 2 4 6 3 2 81
Pneumonia 25 32 19 22 8 13 17 4 5 3 13 10 2 173
TABLE II. BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY - BASE & T.._of 0. (TARANTO Excluded)
INFECTIOUS DISEASE - ADMISSIONS DEO. 1Q17 - DEO. 1918 (Inclusive)
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Auk . Sept. 0 ct. Nov. Dec. Totals.
Average Strength 13,389 14,510 14,387 18,135 15,886 12,551 16,008 17,087 17,269 20,738 20,696 24,836 20,025 17,809 (Mean)
Measles 0 1 1 9 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 17
Rubella 0 3 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Chickenpox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Smallpox 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cerebro-Spinal
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Typhus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -




0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 7 5 2 4 0 22
1693 11 5 10 20 24 38 20 13 6 8 3 2
Anthrax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Erysipelas 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Tetanus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Trachoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0
Malta Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0
Spirochaetosis 
I ctero-Haemorrhagica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Diphtheria 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 1 13
Scarlatina 0 2 2 1 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 2 0 15
Typhoid Group 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 8
Dysentery 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 6 8 10 5 6 1 42
Influenza - - - - - - - 2348 1882 921 423 5574
Tuberculosis 
(Pulmonary) 0 3 0 3 3 4 1 2 3 3 3 2 0 27
Pneumonia 3 3 3 2 0 4 1 3 0 8 27 2 0 56
TABLE I I I » BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY ; TARANTO (Mediterranean L. of 0.)
INFECTIOUS DISEASES t ADMISSIONS pro. 1917 - PRO. 191S (inclusive)
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Totals.
Average Strength Not known as Ttiranto was a staging camp for tr<oop t o and f rom the East.
Measles 11 69 17 43 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 0 153
Rubella 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 12
Chickenpox 0 1 1 1 9 9 7 9 4 4 6 2 0 53
Smallpox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Cerebro-Spinal
Fever 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7
Typhus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Mumps 6 14 30 49 45 19 14 7 5 53 72 7 5 326
Primary
Malaria
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 18 11 11 6 3 60
Recurrent 7 30 61 59 37 106 83 143 99 102 71 74 34 906
Anthrax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Erysipelas 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Tetanus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Trachoma 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5
Malta Fever 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
Spirochaetosis 
I otero-Haemorrhacica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Diphtheria 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 10
Scarlatina 0 1 s 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Typhoid Group 0 0 s 2 0 0 2 7 0 3 11 6 1 34




1 0 s s 6 2 1 8 11 4 8 5 10 60
Pneumonia 
*— .----- 0 39 39 lo
4" 9 '(T" 5 7... ™ TT ~T2 ~----
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TABLE IV. SIXTH ITALIAN ARMY (ARTAfln FRONT)
   (Excluding the Attached French arid "British Troops)
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Diagnosis Confirmed) ; ADM IS SI0NS_ APRIL -  DEC. 1918 (Inclusive ) 
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May- June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Totals.
Average Strength - - - - 195,000 304,115 196,141 304,951 203,074 204,926 199,996 214,292 190,000 201,389 (Mean)
Measles 13 31 14 2 4 1 4 4 3 76
Rubella Not Notifiable in Ita lian  Army.
Chickenpox 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 4 9
Smallpox 9 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 16
Cerebro-Spinal
Fever 7 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 15
Typhus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Mumps 50 73 36 14 13 9 2 13 22 222
Prl”al'>r 1 3 1 147 94 117 24 0 1 387
Recurrent 83 160 94 298 246 236 109 82 4 1312
Anthrax 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Erysipelas 35 30 6 4 2 6 1 2 15 91
Tetanus 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 8
Trachoma 6 1 5 4 7 12 6 5 10 56
Malta Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 as
t  xSPirQchaetosis I c t ero -Ha emo r rha gi c a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Diphtheria 0 3 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 9
Scarlatina 3 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 17
Typhoid Grout 38 51 37 r 44 113 120 25 32 24 484
Dysentery 3 5 17 60 454 518 100 25 7 1189
Influenza 0 8847 3498 120 450 1541 7080 2444 1789 25,769
Tubérculoais 
(Pulmonary) 15 16 16 21 18 20 14 12 7 139
Pneumonia Not Notifiable in Ita lian  Army
TABLE V. FRENCH ARMY IN ITALY -  ASIAGO FRONT.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES : ADMISSIONS a p r t t . -  DECEMBER 1918 (Inclusive)
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. ¡March ¡April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. [ Nov. Dec. Totals
Average Strength Apprcj¡»ximately 48 >000 (Two Infantry Divisions + Corps Troops)







Mumps 88 42 24 0 9 33 25 5 17 229
Malnrln. Primary 0 0 0 0 17 29 - 3 0 1 50JLctricl






I c t ero-H a emo rrha gi ca
Diphtheria 11 5 3 0 1 0 3 2 1 26
Scarlatina 4 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 12
Typhoid Group 5 3 1 5 17 7 1 6 2 47
Dysentery





TABLE VI. PROVINCE OF VICENZA :__KINGDOM OF ITALY.
*"“ Local Notifications o f Infectious Disease among C iv ilians.
POPULATION: Estimated number of Inhabitants remaining 460 »000: Refugees 40»000. TOTAL -  500»000.
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. Maroh April May June July Aug. Sept i Oct* Nov. Dec. Totals
Jan.
1919
V Estimated Total Population ss 500,000
Measles I l l 73 ©0 134 143 108 105 42 13 9 0 2 820 17
Rubella
Chickenpox •
Smallpox 16 14 32 21 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 0
Cerebro-Spinal
Fever 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.









Diphtheria & Croup 65 10S 74 53 35 27 38 57 56 42 15 20 584 22
Scarlatina 16 9 10 a 19 10 7 3 22 5 0 0 107 0
Typhoid Group 13 22 9 l i 24 31 123 574 523 110 13 9 14-52 3




*  Notification o f Influenza obligatory from October.
TABLE VII* KINGDOM OF ITALY.
NOTIFICATIONS OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE t 1918. 
ESTIMATED POPULATION -  55 MILLIONS (Approximately)
1917 19 IS
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Measles 3197 4945 7765 8106 9036 11658 7369 4199 3197 1434 794 1116 62,816
Rubella
Chickenpox 508 491 499 308 289 248 147 130 220 103 249 888 4,080
Smallpox
Cerebro-Spinal
Fever 155 222 315 249 285 174 77 50 28 18 10 35 1,618










Diphtheria & Croun 1674 2142 2121 1403 1246 1348 959 1278 2084 1215 891 949 17,310
Scarlatina 752 700 807 7 IS 782 877 567 554 840 406 254 344 7 .601
Typhoid Group 1359 994 1098 1176 1378 1890 2607 727 i 10,717 3064 1268 823 33.705Dysentery 61 45 17 15 36 314 13Ml 4390 5608 1574 144 88 1 3 -5 4 8
.
DIARRHOEAL DISEASES.
The chief cause fo r anxiety as regards the health 
of the British  Troops in Ita ly  during 1918 -  particu­
la r ly  during the summer and autumn -  was the prevalence 
of infectious disease of the bowel, e.g. typhoid, 
dysentery and diarrhoea, especially in the c iv ilian  
population of the Province of Vicenza, amongst whom 
this form of disease is  considered to be endemic -  
a fact not very surprising in view of the comparative­
ly low standard of hygiene prevailing there, and the 
inadequacy of local c iv i lian  medical arrangements for  
coping with the condition; an inadequacy which was 
enhanced during the period under review, as has already 
been indicated, by the war conditions prevailing and 
the concomitant overcrowding.
Prom the tables which follow, one sees that the 
incidence of Typhoid Fever was three times as great 
in the Province of Vicenza at this time as in the 
rest of the Kingdom of Ita ly ; while Dysentery was 
twice as prevalent.
When one takes into account the fact that special
hospitals for the iso lation and treatment of these
diseases among the c iv ilian  population only came into
being during September 1918, and even then only on
our urgent representations to the Ita lian  authorities  
Pointing/
pointing out their necessity, i t  w i l l  be seen that 
the danger to our troops was very grave.
During this period,we never ceased to impress 
on a l l  our troops the necessity fo r e ffic ien t in ­
oculation and re-inoculation as our main line of 
defence against a possibly crippling outbreak; and 
the results of our campaign, which appear in one of 
the tables la te r , show with what success our measures 
were attended.
NOMENCLATURE.
I t  is  necessary here to refer to a great d i f ­
ficu lty , from the administrative point of view, with 
regard to terminology as applied to c lin ica l con­
ditions .
During the early days of the Dysentery epidemic 
in Italy, comparison of the sta tist ics  of the French 
and Ita lian  Troops in the VIth Ita lian  Army with our 
own revealed what seemed like a much greater in ­
cidence among the B ritish  Troops. But on investiga­
tion this disparity was found to be due to lax ity  in 
nomenclature.
For example, cases which were termed ”C linical
Dysentery” by us were usually termed ”Colitis"
by the Ita lian  c iv i lian  practitioners, who were, for
the most part and fo r reasons already indicated, 
©lderly/
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elderly and overworked country practitioners. These 
so-called "C o lit is "  cases in large numbers -  and on© 
speaks from repeated personal observation -  were never 
notified, and therefore one can only regard the f i g ­
ures given to show the prevalence of these diseases 
among c iv ilian s , as a gross under-estimate.
Much the same views were held as regards "C lin ica l  
Dysentery" in the Ita lian  Army until the summer of 
19IS, and even in the French Army, while recognised by 
clinicians as "Diarrhoea Dysenteriforme", they appear­
ed in French sta t is t ics  under the heading of "Diarrhoea"
Again with regard to the Typhoid Group of d is ­
eases, these cases which were c l in ica l ly  Typhoid and 
c lassified  by us as belonging to the "Enteric Group" 
in the absence o f positive bacteriological findings, 
received various appellations among the Ita lians , and 
by the French were often called "Embarras Gastrique 
Febrile " .
Repeated and urgent representations were made to 
our colleagues of both the French and Ita lian  Armies 
urging the necessity of adopting some uniform system 
of nomenclature i f  inter-notification  of Infectious 
Disease was to serve any useful purpose.
During the month of August 1918 both adopted the 
term "C lin ica l Dysentery" and moreover adopted much 
the same methods of dealing with Diarrhoeal Diseases 
as we did. The Ita lians further -  but not the French -  
ultimately/
53.
ultimately agreed to the appropriate use of the term 
"Enteric Group".
For these reasons alone, i f  for no others, I  think 
we are entitled to consider that the figures with 
regard to Incidence and Mortality of Dysentery and the 
Typhoid Group of Diseases in both the French and 
Ita lian  Armies are rather an under-statement o f the 
case, as compared with our own.
The whole situation with regard to these diseases 
among British , French and Ita lian  Troops of the Vlth 
Ita lian  Army during the summer of 1918 may be crysta l­
lised from the following statement
TYPHOID BRITISH FRENCH ITALIAN
GROUP. *
Incidence 1.54 1,3 * 3.2Mortality 0.16 . 14 0.4
Method o f )  C lin ical^ 17 N il* 3.7




Incidence 10.1 14.7 7.8
Mortality 0.199 0.11 0.26
Method o f)C lin ica l$ 52.3 94.1 83*8
Diagnosis)Laboratory% 47.7 5.9 16.2
* *  N .B .- Incidence = Total Annual Incidence per 
1000 Mean Average Strength.
34.
DIARRHOEA AND ITS RELATION TO DYSENTERY.
In a l l  theatres of war of which sta tis t ics  are 
available, i t  would appear that outbreaks of Dysentery 
are frequently preceded or accompanied and usually  
followed by a rise  in the incidence of Diarrhoea.
And this was the sequence o f events in Ita ly  also.
Factors predisposing to diarrhoea are unavoidable 
incidentals to the rigours of campaigning, e.g. close 
contact o f men, great physical exertion, rapidly  
alternating extremes of temperature with an absence 
of fa c i l i t ie s  fo r compensation, monotonous diet often 
of preserved food, and mechanical i r r ita t io n  o f the 
alimentary mucosa by dust or sand. And a l l  these 
factors likewise predispose to Dysentery.
Indeed from the practical and military point of 
view, in the present state o f bacteriological knowledge 
and technique, i t  is  probable that the number of cases 
of Diarrhoea is  a fa r  more important indication o f a 
rise in Dysentery than are bacterio logica lly  proved 
cases. In any case, from an epidemiological point of  
view, when occurring in a dysenteric area; a l l  d iar­
rhoeas should i f  possible be regarded as potential 
cases of Dysentery.
From the administrative point of view? it  was 
found easier to investigate the epidemic by studying 
diarrhoea as a whole. Diarrhoea is  a positive sign
easy of determination, whereas the lapse of time 
necessary before a laboratory can report decisively  
is a factor which is  apt to v it ia te  administrative 
measures which may be necessary, such as tracing and 
restricting movements of troops and investigating  
places and sources o f infection.
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF DIARRHOEAL DISEASES.
1. Locality .
During the period of maximum incidence of  
Diarrhoea and Dysentery (June -  September 19IS ),  the 
British Troops formed part o f the VIth Ita lian  Army 
and were holding a line on the Asiago Plateau.
Two Divisions were in the Line on the Plateau while 
one Division was in the Reserve Divisional Area on 
the Plain.
The summer of 1918 was not abnormally hot fo r an 
Ita lian  summer, but for our troops i t  was distinctly  
trying in spite o f the wearing of light khaki d r i l l  
and sun helmets which were regulation during the 
summer.
The chief features were the exceeding dryness 
and concomitant dustiness of the Plains and the hot 
airless  nights, while on the Plateau (which averaged 
roughly/
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roughly 3000 -  4000 feet above sea le v e l )  i t  was much 
cooler during the day and often quite cold at night.
The change from Plateau to Plain during the hot 
weather was very considerable and, when one travelled  
by motor, was indeed dramatic as the h i l l s  rose almost 
sheer from the Plain and the road up was a purely 
military one constructed just before our arriva l and 
in large part blasted out o f the solid rock like  a 
gigantic corkscrew. One could in a very short space 
of time pass from the comfortable airy warmth of the 
Plateau in a curving dusty descent of the h i l ls id e  
to the s t i f l in g  a ir less  heat of the parched and sun­
baked plains where any vehicle at once raised a cloud 
of dust which hung about fo r  long with never a breath 
of wind to dispel i t .
The Divisions in Line on the Plateau then had 
these advantages over the Division in Reserve that
(1) i t  was cooler both by day and by night, (2) i t  
was destitute o f c iv ilians and (3) i t  was less  dusty 
and not swarming with f l i e s .  To most of us these 
advantages more than outweighed the disadvantages of 
desultory s h e l l - f i re .
H • Seasonal Incidence and Weather Conditions.




(1) A rapid rise  in the incidence of Diarrhoea during 
the f i r s t  week in July, which was maintained at
a high level t i l l  i t  f e l l  again at the end of 
September. A return of high incidence of Diar­
rhoea in November.
(2) That Dysentery was at a maximum in September 
while Diarrhoea with a maximum in July preceded 
i t .
(3) That Dysentery subsided to a very low level by 
November, while Diarrhoea -  though i t  subsided 
to a low level in October -  rose again consider­
ably in November.
As regards weather conditions i t  was noted that Rain 
seemed to cause a decrease in incidence while hot dry 
rainless spells caused an increase. Directly the 
really hot summer weather broke and i t  became cooler 
there was a gradual but steadily maintained decrease 
in incidence.
While dealing with climatic conditions one should 
record that i t  was invariably noted how re la tive ly  
susceptible new arr iva ls  (reinforcements, etc. ) were 
to diarrhoea on entering the area.
I l l »  Effects of Moves and R e lie fs .
The following points clearly  emerged on studying 
the problem.-
(1) That in the case of each Division the period i t
spent in the Line on the Plateau invariably showed 
a/
a much lower incidence than the time i t  was 
resting in the Reserve Divisional Area in the 
Plain.
Each Division showed increases which were quite 
steeple-like, coinciding almost invariably with 
re l ie fs  of Brigades in the Line; while in certain  
cases where the r e l i e f  was more prolonged and 
spread out over 3 or 4 days, these increases were 
not so markedly steeple-like but less abrupt and 
more prolonged.
The important point is  that these rises  
occurred usually 24 -  36 hours a fter the r e l i e f .
Now in military medical s ta t ist ics  rises  
during re l ie fs  are very common: cases which have 
been "held up" by formations in the hope o f a 
rapid return to health and duty are perforce 
evacuated to hospital when that formation has to 
become mobile. I t  w i l l  be readily understood 
then that before marching out there is  always an 
increase o f "petits malades".
But in the case under review the suggestion 
that these rises were due to "unloading" o f cases 
held up in units despite regulations is  tota lly  
discountenanced by the fact that the r ise  occurs 
after the completion of the r e l i e f  and not during 
the beginning as is usually the case. Such rises  
night be explained by the increased exposure and 
fatigue/
fatigue that a r e l ie f  entails during the march.
The i l l - e f f e c t  o f residence in the plains as com- 
pased with the plateau is  also shown by the fact that 
taking a l l  three Divisions together the admissions for. 
Diarrhoea averaged 17.88 per day in the plains as com­
pared with 11.46 per day on the plateau.
Further evidence that movement of troops and 
changing areas affects the incidence of Diarrhoea 
seems to be discoverable in the fact already noted 
that, while Diarrhoea sank to a low level in October, 
i t  rose again 3harply in November. This r ise  is  I 
think directly traceable to the fact that towards the 
end of October the main portion of the B rit ish  Force 
was moved secretly' and by forced marches to the Piave 
front for the f in a l attack. The resulting increase 
may be attributed to two factors.
(a) Change of Area. The probability  is  that there
was a fresh infection in the d istr ic t  we occupied.
Furthermore in the rapid advance into re ­
conquered territory  on the other side of the 
Piave we found a great deal of diarrhoea among 
prisoners and c iv ilian s.
After the Armistice the whole Area was packed 
with starving Austrian prisoners, starving c iv i lian  
refugees and starving Ita lian  prisoners of war re ­
turning as best they could from the cages whose 




(b ) Nor can we altogether exclude as a causal factor  
in our increase of Diarrhoea in November the 
fatigue and hardships suffered by our own Troops 
during their victorious advance into a country 
which had been systematically devastated and 
despoiled by the Austrians.
IV. Places as Sources of Infection.
I t  was early noticed that certain spots 
appeared prone to form infective foci as was evidenced 
by a re la tive ly  higher incidence of diarrhoea in units 
marching into these areas.
The three worst places in the B rit ish  area appear­
ed to be Montecchio Maggiore, Arzignano and Comedo, 
a l l  of which were in the Reserve Divisional Area on 
the plain.
Here in tabular form is  a record of the incidence 
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This table shows that each of the three Divisions 
occupying these places found that the Brigade (of 4 
battalions) which occupied Montecchio Maggiore had the 
greatest incidence of Diarrhoea and that too, despite 
the fact that Montecchio Maggiore was a smaller place 
than Arzignano with fewer c iv i l ian  inhabitants and 
fewer refugees.
As the incidence in Mohtecchio kept persistently  
higher i t  wa3 thought that re -in fection  was carried on 
from Brigade to Brigade by the b i l le t s .
The place was divided into 4 areas -  each representing . 
a Battalion B i l le t  -  and the following figures show 
the result of an investigation into the figures o f the 
respective battalion areas.
INCIDENCE OF DIARRHOEA IN MONTEOCHIO MAGGIORE 
Period: July -  August 19IS.







1 W. Battn. 21 W. Battn. 4
i
W. Batt'f 19 | 44
2 X. " 16 X. " 28 X. i! ! 29i 73
3 Y. " 43 Y. 30 y . " ; e 81




This table tends to show that Areas 2 and 3 were 
the worst but the evidence appears inconclusive and 
when on the spot one found i t  d i f f ic u lt  to account 
for any disparity in incidence.
One possible factor which we stressed at the 
time, from the administrative point of view, and which 
existed in a l l  three places, was that two main roads 
crossed in the v illages -  the roads were exceedingly 
dusty and the stream of army t ra f f ic  both motor and 
horse-drawn was pretty continuous.
Following up these cases of Diarrhoea reported 
from Montecchio Maggiorp -  49 out of the 235 reported 
from the 4 battalion b i l le t in g  areas were returned 
as Dysentery, of which 30 were Shiga and the remaining 
19 "C lin ica l Dysentery" without confirmatory laboratory  
evidence.
OTHER SUSPECTED FACTORS IN AETIOLOGY.
F1193.
While no definite bacteriological research on 
the influence of f l i e s  as carriers of the Diarrhoeal 
Diseases was carried out in Ita ly ,  a l l  the evidence 
was in favour of condemning them here as in other 
theatres of war.
The number of f l i e s  became enormous directly the 
hot weather started -  particu larly  in the Plain where, 
as has been shown, the diarrhoeal diseases were most 
prevalent. And i t  was in the v illages  particu larly  
that they swarmed^as c iv ilian  sanitation was element­
ary or non est -  and again i t  was in the v illages  
that our troops got the greatest incidence of the 
disease.
I shall never forget going personally to inspect 
one particular house on the outskirts of such a 
village which was suspect. One case of ‘c o l i t i s 1 had 
been reported from the house (a very small farm) in 
some of the out-buildings of which a few of our troops
were b ille ted , and where butter, milk and fru it  could 
be bought. I found in the house a young g i r l  who was 
a perfect c lin ica l specimen of Typhoid (the case re­
ported to us) while close questioning e lic ited  the 
fact/
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fact that two other children "upstairs" had been i l l  
for a few days also -  in a garret approached by a 
ladder I found them lying -  also undoubted early  
Typhoids. I then enquired as to the methods of d is­
posal of excreta and was taken outside and shown a 
central midden such as was the regulation in Flemish 
farms on which,I was informed,the excreta were thrown -7 / '
and from i t  the f l i e s  rose in dense buzzing clouds 
as I approached. Of course our troops were instantly  
posted elsewhere and a l l  paths to the farm labelled  
conspicuously "Out of Bounds to a l l  B ritish  Troops" 
but to us i t  was a continual marvel that the incidence 
of Typhoid kept so low among our troops.
Food.
Apart from the probable infection of food by 
f l ie s ,  there seemed a considerable amount of evidence 
to show that quite a percentage of Diarrhoea among 
our Troops was due to over-indulgence in c iv ilian  fare  
on their r e l ie f  from the trenches to the Rest area.
Thorough investigation revealed no one definite  
causal agent but on the whole we blamed fru it  mostly: 
it  was frequently cheap and i t  was d i f f ic u lt  or im­
possible to prevent troops taking a surfeit of water­
melon (often growing in stagnant and probably polluted 
swamps) unripe grapes (growing in profusion everywhere), 
apples/
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At other times one could hardly avoid blaming 
our own rations fo r , in spite of the strictest super­
vision, ”blown” tins of food-stuffs  must occasionally 
get into circulation, and frozen meat in the heat of 
an Ita lian  summer has not the same l i f e  as in more 
temperate climes.
Dust.
While i t  is  extremely d i f f ic u lt  to incriminate 
dust as a defin ite ly  causal factor in the production 
of dysentery and diarrhoea, there were circumstances 
present which seemed to bear out the theory that it  
was at anyrate a contributory aetio logica l factor.
F irst ly  the increase of diarrhoea during the very 
hot spells when the dust was one of our bug-bears 
tends to support the theory, and reference has already 
been made to the fact that the v illages  responsible 
for the greatest number of cases a l l  contained dusty 
cross-roads disturbed by a practically  continuous 
stream of t r a f f ic .  And certainly when showers of 
rain la id  the dust the incidence of diarrhoea dimin­
ished.
Further the observation was made that although 
troops of a l l  branches of the service lived on the 
Plains, nearly 50 per cent of the dysentery cases 




vehicles who were particu larly  exposed to dust by 
reason of their duties. Indeed their faces were usual­
ly greyish-white with a thick layer of dust a fter  a 
journey of any distance.
In one instance too i t  was thought that a Ration 
Dump -  at the side of a main^much used., and very dusty 
road -  which was imperfectly protected from dust, might- 
be the cause of a re la tive ly  high diarrhoea rate among 
the troops who were supplied from i t .
In any case from the administrative point of view 
attention was very decidedly paid to dust as a factor, 
and stringent orders were issued and enforced as re­
gards adequate protection of Ration Dumps and food 
supplies generally.
Water.
Whereas in most other theatres of War the water 
supply was an ever present source of danger to the 
health of the Troops -  in Ita ly  there was very l i t t l e  
cause for anxiety on that score.
In Prance and Belgium fo r  example, and particu­
larly  the la tte r  country, we were largely dependent 
on shallow wells often in close proximity to the 
central midden so invariably found at the small farm3 
there, and consequently almost inevitably swarming 
with B. Coli and occasionally the more pathogenic 
organisms of the Coli-Typhoid group.
In/
In Ita ly  on the contrary the quality of the water 
can only be termed excellent.
Most o f the area in the Plains occupied by B ritish  
Troops was supplied by a series of Artesian wells which 
emerge at a certain level from the mountain foot.
The Troops in line on the Plateau had, i f  anything,
a better water supply from wells which gushed out at
the foot o f the mountains whence i t  was pumped up to 
•»
the Plateau.
Even so, a l l  water sources were carefu lly  and 
periodically investigated and bacteriological examina­
tions were frequently made, but in no case with any 
positive result as regards the finding of pathogenic 
organisms.
The water-carts of units were also tested fre ­
quently by the Water duty personnel of Sanitary Section 
and the further precaution was taken of s t i l l  in s is t ­
ing on the usual chlorination of water, in force in 
other theatres of war, being carried out. This was 
considered advisable because, i f  once a unit got into 
the habit of dispensing with chlorination as a pre­
cautionary measure, the habit would not easily be 
resumed i f  at any time change of scene should make i t  
indispensable.
During our stay in Ita ly  only two incidents 




(a ) In the case of a Soda-water factory which was 
started by the B rit ish  Army where the water used for  
bottling was found to have a considerable B. Coli 
content. When this factory was moved to a new site
on this discovery the incidence of diarrhoea in Messes 
supplied by i t  diminished.
(b ) Several cases of severe diarrhoea at one time 
seemed traceable to the eating of water-cress and 
examination of the beds from which the cress was 
obtained showed definite pollution of the water.
Personal Cleanliness.
It  wa3 thought that the transmission of infection  
by hands was a distinct source of danger and as fa r  
as possible the necessity of washing before meals was 
impressed on the troops; more so as i t  has been shown 
by experiment that a considerable percentage of men 
soil their fingers during defaecation and micturition. 
They were also made to keep their eating and drinking 
utensils thoroughly clean.
In this connection unit cooks particularly  came 
in for the strictest supervision both as regards their  
personal cleanliness and their cleanliness in cooking. 
Further they were of course invariably marked men in 
the event of suspicion fa l l in g  on a ,! carrier” as the 
cause of a heavy incidence in any particular unit.
In at least one instance in Ita ly  a unit with an un­
duly high incidence of dysentery was found to have a 
cook/
cook who was a dysentery-carrier, he having had the 
disease a few months before on another front.
Of course i t  is  hardly necessary to say that the 
greatest care was taken in declaring a patient free
from infection before he returned to his unit* As a
rule three separate bacteriological or cytological 
examinations 'at intervals were made a fter convalescence 
before the man was returned to duty. In the C8.se of 
a man who was a cook, every endeavour was made to 
prevent him acting as a cook again even i f  he was 
found negative a fter  Typhoid or Dysentery.
Civilian Sanitation and Overcrowding.
Enough has already been said to make i t  clear
that this was a big  and ever-present menace to our
Troops.
Bacillary Dysentery and Typhoid are endemic in 
the ares, we occupied.
There was hopeless and inevitable over-crowding 
of civilians -  inhabitants and refugees: a l l  rules 
of' hygiene were ignored by them and when disease did 
break out in a house only the worst cases or those 
with enough money were able to get any attention.
Often indeed i t  was due to the exertions of our own 
medical o fficers  that cases were discovered and 
diagnosed at a l l  -  urged on as they were not only by 
humanitarian/
51.
humanitarian motives but with the view of having the 
danger to our own troops removed i f  possible.
The main point of this Thesis indeed is  to attempt 
to show how successful administrative e fforts  in the 
British Forces in Ita ly  were, in keeping the troops 
so comparatively immune from preventible epidemics in 
such a danger-laden environment.
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Before attempting to analyse the available  
figures i t  is perhaps necessary to preface any con­
clusions by remarking what is generally conceded -  
that the bacteriological diagnosis of Dysentery during 
the War was unsatisfactory. Diarrhoea and Dysentery 
were responsible fo r  a considerable proportion of the 
casualties on a l l  fronts -  more especially in tropical 
and sub-tropical climates* In G a llipo li ,  Salonika, 
Egypt» Mesopotamia, East Africa and even in Ita ly ,  
Prance and Flanders epidemics of varying magnitude 
arose at d ifferent times and as a source of loss to 
fighting efficiency, practically  supplanted the 
Enteric of former wars.
And yet in many of these epidemics bacteriológica  
examination fa i le d  to be of any help at a l l  -  hence
the necessity of considering Diarrhoea and Dysentery 
together as i t  was so often impossible to separate 
them, particu larly  when the cases occurred in huge 
numbers as was frequently the case, and so swamped 
the available bacteriological s ta ffs .  So much was 
this the case that for a l l  practical purposes, during 
epidemic periods at any rate, the passage of blood 
and mucus was suffic ient to authorize a temporary 
diagnosis of C lin ical Dysentery with removal to the 
special/
55.
special medical unit usually set aside for reception 
of such cases.
Perhaps the chief reason why bacteriology in this 
f ie ld  was so impotent is because, to obtain positive  
results, rapid examination a fter  onset of the in i t ia l  
symptoms is imperative.
Dorendorf and Kolle in examining 1000 stools con­
taining mucus during an epidemic in Galicia were able 
to iso late B. Shiga only 6 times.
In the la tte r  ha lf of 1916 Schweriner (Berl. Klin. 
Wcbnschr. 1918, 55) made an extensive investigation  
into the subject and was able to obtain a positive re ­
sult in only 18 per cent of cases. He found that 
Dysentery b a c i l l i  are rapidly overgro?m by saprophytes 
so that examination of stools becomes progressively  
negative as time goes on. Thus he found in 
cases examined in f i r s t  4 days of disease 57$ positive  
" w •from 4th to 12th n " n 28$ "
" ,f a fter  12th day " ” " 18$ "
This bacterial overcrowding is favoured by heat and 
can be much retarded by packing specimens in ice.
Prom our point of view we considered that by placing 
the bacteriologist actually at the special hospital 
for such cases we might obviate the d iff icu lty  to a 
certain extent, and this perhaps accounts for the 
re lative ly  high percentage of laboratory diagnoses we 
were able to show.
56.
PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR DIAGNOSING DYSENTERY.
From the administrative point of view there were 
many d i f f ic u lt ie s  in arranging for rapid segregation 
and observation of suspect cases.
Among troops generally^ slight attacks of d iar­
rhoea -  so commonly incidental to the hardships of 
campaigning -  are apt to be overlooked by both o fficers  
and men as not worthy of notice.
Furthermore individual medical o fficers  in charge 
of troops had very varying views as to what constit­
uted Dysentery, and la s t ly  even the bacteriologists  
held conflicting views on the laboratory procedure, 
etc.
The orders issued by my Chief, the Director of 
Medical Services for Ita ly  -  Major-General Sir F.R. 
Newland, K.C.M.G., C.B., were as follows -  and these 
orders were s tr ic t ly  enforced especially at epidemic 
periods.
(1) A ll  cases o f diarrhoea must be sent to Hospital. 
(In the case of troops in the Forward Area this 
’Hospital1 meant a Field Ambulance).
(2) A ll  cases of diarrhoea that persisted longer 
than 4S hours in a Field Ambulance must be sent 
to the Special Casualty Clearing Station.
(Of/
57.
(Of course any obvious case of Acute C lin ical 
Dysentery was sent to C.C.S. without delay .)
(5) The laboratories attached to G.C.S. were to make 
one bacteriological examination of a l l  such cases 
and further cytological examinations in a l l  
suspicious dysentery cases.
It  was not until the in i t ia l  period of the outbreak 
had passed that a definite scheme of pathological 
inquiry became standardised, as there were many d i­
vergencies of opinion as to the value and practic­
ab ility  of Bacillary  Cytological and Serological 
diagnosis.
The D.M.S. f in a l ly  issued the following orders 
on the subject.
Three examinations must be carried out, of a l l  
Dysentery cases requiring examination.
No.l Exam . -  The faeces to be examined both bacterio- 
log ica lly  and cytologically as early as 
possible in the course of the i l ln ess .
No.2 Exam11. -  Cytological examination (to obtain
evidence of ulceration of the intestine) 
to be made on the 3rd day following  
examination No.l.
No.3 Examn. Cytological examination of faeces on 5th 
day following examination No.2.
Examination/
58.
Examinations No. 2 and 5 were dispensed with i f  a 
prior positive diagnosia were established.
The factors which prompted the institution of 
this procedure as a standard onê  were firstly^ that 
the chance of iso lating and identifying the causal 
organism was so greatly diminished by the lapse of 
time that the number of positive cases obtained by 
such repeated examinations was not commensurate with 
*the time, labour and expense o f carrying out repeated 
examinations -  o f positive cases six-sevenths were 
isolated at the f i r s t  examination where more than one 
vías done. Secondly^ cytological examinations revealing 
the presence or absence of ulceration y ie ld  fa r  more 
valuable evidence of the progress of the disease from 
the m ilitary point of view.
LABORATORY METHODS.
I do not propose to deal with this aspect particu  
larly^ but would point out some factors which appear 
to me to somewhat v it ia te  the French and Ita lian  
statistics  as compared with our own -  or at any rate 
tend to show that our s tatist ics  are not lenient in 
comparison.
F irst as regards the figures given for Dysentery,
i t  w il l  be noted that while 47.7% of the British  cases 
are/
are laboratory findings, only 5 .9% of the French and 
16*2$ o f the Ita lians  are confirmed in the laboratory.
The methods o f haemo culture appeared to be 
identical in a l l  the A llied  Armies, but in connection 
with the iso lation  and identification of pathogenic 
organisms from faeces, whereas the Ita lians employed 
mainly Endo's Medium, in our own laboratories Neutral 
Red Lactose B i le -s a lt  Agar was mainly used fo r the 
f i r s t  p lating out process.
The French use fo r a similar purpose Neutral Red 
Lactose Agar, but omit the B ile -S a lt ,  a circumstance 
which perhaps may have accounted fo r  their lack of 
success as compared with ourselves.
S t i l l  further, the French laboratories were as a 
rule g miles or so away from the hospital and conse­
quently the faeces as examined were not always fresh; 
whereas in our Army the laboratories were situated  
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shows the monthly incidence of Dysentery in the 
Brit ish , French and Ita lian  troops.
Table XI
shows Admissions, Deaths, Case Mortality and 
re lative  incidence of Diarrhoea and Dysentery in 
British , French and Ita lian  troops of the VIth Army 
Table XII
shows re lative  incidence per month of the types of 
Dysentery fo r  the Base, L. of C. and Taranto.
Table XIII
shows Diagnosis, Incidence and Mortality of Diar­
rhoea and Dysentery in the British  Force (Forward 
Area).
As regards the actual numbers, i t  w i l l  be seen that 
the epidemic caused 859 casualties in the forward 
area -  the French and Ita lian  Army figures roughly 
correspond in ratio .
I t  w i l l  be noted that the important rise in 
numbers in a l l  three Armies started in July and lasted  
t i l l  October with the maximum fa l l in g  in August.
This r ise  was preceded by a considerable increase of 
Diarrhoea in June.
As regards the percentage of Dysentery to Diar- 
rho ea /
65.
Diarrhoea, the French show the highest percentage, -  
528 cases of Dysentery out o f 1169 cases of Diarrhoea 
and Dysentery. The British  Force showed 859 cases of  
Dysentery out of a total of 3988 cases of Diarrhoea 
and Dysentery, and the Ita lian  Army 1189 cases of 




British  ” 








The figures are summarised as follows
Method of Diagnosis.
Incidence. Mortality C lin ical Laboratory
British 10.1 0.199 52.3$ 47.7$
French 14.7 0.11 94.1$ 5.9$
Ita lian 7.8 0.26 83.8$ 16.2$
The point one would draw particular attention to here, 
is the 're lative ly  high percentage of the British  cases 
confirmed by the laboratories., to which attention was 
previously drawn.
As regards the C iv ilian  Tables, i t  w i l l  be seen 
that Vicenza Province shows only 330 cases but that 
the/
the numbers per month correspond re la t ive ly  to the 
Army figures except that the number in October is  very 
small.
The figure 330 wa3 in our opinion quite ludicrous 
and represented more approximately the mortality than 
the incidence. At any rate these figures only re ­
present the worst cases which were sent to Hospital 
and exclude almost entirely those cases which from 
the epidemiological point of view were the most danger­
ous to us, namely those suffering from an attenuated 
form of the disease -  and one can vouch from personal 
observation that they abounded in the neighbourhood.
But the average c iv ilian  there seemed to regard this 
endemic condition as an annual event of comparatively 
l i t t l e  moment and i t  was undoubted that the vast 
majority escaped notification  -  and indeed usually  
medical attention -  altogether.
BAOILLARY AND AMOEBIC DYSENTERY.
The history of Dysentery indicates that i t  is  
usually the bac illa ry  type which follows armies.
It  is  essentially  sudden in onset and attacks men 
obviously -  in the trenches, on the march, or in camp. 
Amoebic dysentery is  a more insidious condition and 
not/
67.
not so rapidly recognised: formerly thought to be 
confined to the tropica and sub -trop ics,it  is  now known 
to be widely spread throughout the temperate parts of  
Europe. For example Yakimoff (Bull. Soc. de path, 
exot. 1917. 10) arrived at the conclusion that amoebic 
dysentery does arise in Russia, e.g. Odessa, Trans- 
caucasus, Astrakkan and Saratoff, apart from cases 
introduced into the country.
Martinez too (Arch. med. beiges 1918. 71) deter­
mined its  endemic existence in Spain.
But true to history i t  was the bac illa ry  type 
which predominated in a l l  Armies during the Great War.
It  has been computed that roughly only 7% o f a l l  
c lin ica l dysenteries in the Eastern theatres of War 
were due to Entamoeba h istolytica while in France and 
Flanders i t  played only a minor role and was respons­
ib le  for only 2.8$ of a l l  cases.
Reference to Tables XI, XII and XIII 
show that in Ita ly  in the Forward area the epidemic 
was almost entirely bac illa ry , there being only 9 cases 
of amoebic dysentery out of the 859 cases in the 
forward area.
Likewise in the Vlth Ita lian  Army there were only 
6 cases o f amoebic out o f a total of 1189.
The figures fo r our Base and L. of 0. show a 
further 9 cases of amoebic out of a total o f only 42 
cases/
cases of dysentery but the figures from Taranto^ while 
small, are of interest as showing the tendency of 
dysentery to form epidemic patches.
The Taranto figures show.-





i .e .  45 out of 148 were amoebic, i . e .  30.5$. 
re la t ive ly  an exceedingly high incidence which is  
only comparable to the state o f a f fa irs  in Mesopotamia 
where the amoebic rate was also very high.
THE TYPES AND PREVALENCE OF BACILLARY DYSENTERY.
As has been already stated, Bacillary Dysentery 
was the common form of the disease in a l l  the Armies 
engaged, but the causal organism has been found to 
vary in d ifferent epidemics and on different fronts. 
The general concensus of opinion was that the more 
severe the epidemic^ the greater the probability  of 
the infection being due to Shiga. The Flexner group 
was much less toxic and the Y group s t i l l  less so.
The tables given may be conveniently summarized 
thus: -
69 .
Ita lian  VIth Army Clin ical Shiga Flexner it y "
I ta lian Troops 1007 81 88 7
Deaths 30 6 3 N il
British Troops 441 268 70 50
Deaths 8 8 N il N il
I t  appears from this summary then that among the 





And this is probably a fa i r ly  correct statement of 
the actual facts , viz. practica lly  4 of Shiga to 1 of  
Flexner.
The Ita lian  figures show that in their troops 
Shiga and Flexner were almost equal, viz.
Flexner 7.4$
Shiga 6.8$
with indeed Flexner s ligh tly  preponderating.
The Ita lian  sta t is t ics  are however somewhat vitiated  
by reason o f the re la t ive ly  small proportion bacterio- 
lo g ica lly  proved and a further source o f error may 
have been in their bacteriological methods.
In any case i t  was generally considered that 
Shiga Tías the principal endemic dysentery of Northern 
Ita ly  -  a view corroborated by Ascoli (Presse mod.
1918).
Shiga/ '
Shiga was much the commonest type o f infection  
in the East and was considered responsible for approx­
imately 50% of a l l  cases, while in Prance and Belgium 
i t  was not nearly so frequent and was held responsible 
in only some 15%> o f cases roughly -  Flexner being the 
commonest type there and occasionally Y.
In the German Army according to Bischoff 
(Deutsche m il . -a r tz l .  Ztschr. 1918. 47) epidemics of 
Dysentery before the war were usually confined to the 
"Y" bac illus  but during the war both Shiga and Flexner 
appeared.
Kisskalt recorded a severe epidemic of Shiga on 
the Eastern front in the early months o f the war.
Germany i t s e l f  became heavily infected with 
Dysentery and in an epidemic in Prussia in 1917 there 
were 59,196 cases and 7,076 deaths, while an editorial 
note in the Medizinische Klinik (14) of 1918, referring  
to the prevalence o f the disease in Germany, pointed 
out that in the second week o f September 1918 there 
were 2020 cases with 229 deaths in Prussia alone.
Nolf Oolard Duliere and Roskam in an account of 
Dysentery in the Belgian Army (Arch. med. Eelges.
1918. 71) noted that in 1915-16 the incidence was low, 
but from July to December of 1917 there was an epidemi 
which reached its  acme from Mid September to Mid- 
October and died away again with the cold weather.
Out o f 1200 cases examined they found Shiga only 12 
times -  /
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times -  the remainder were Flexner or Y and again 
their experience corroborated that o f elsewhere in 
that the mortality was accordingly low, only .25$.
Lancelin and Rideau too (Arch, de med. et de phar. 
mil. 1918. 105) investigating an outbreak at Brest, 
found the majority of cases due to Flexner while the 
few that were due to Shiga were much more severe and 
more toxic. Theŷ  however, drew attention to the fact 
that Flexner tended to be more persistent and chronic 
a fact which was subsequently v e rified  in other 
theatres o f war.
MORTALITY OF DYSENTERY.
The Case-Mortality of the various types and the 
mortality per 1000 mean average strength fo r the 
Ita lia n  and B ritish  troops in the forward area can 
be summarised thus from Table XI.
VIth Ita lia n  Army.









C lin ica l
Dysentery 1.78 0.02 2.8 0.19
Amoebic 11.1 0.01 16.6 0.006
Shiga 2.94 0.09 7.4 0.04
Flexner N il N il 5.4 0.02
Y N il N il N il N il
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These f i g u r e s  bear out g e n e ra l l y  what was the 
usual exper ience ,  v i z . ,  that  d iscounting Amoebic 
Dysentery, the Shiga type o f  b a c i l l a r y  dysentery  was 
in v a r ia b ly  the most f a t a l  -  the F lexner  l e s s  so, w h i le  
the Y i s  in v a r ia b ly  attended by a death ra te  which 
i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  n e g l i g i b l e .
The only point to note is that the Case Mortality  
in the Ita lia n  troops was considerably higher for a l l  
types.
In other theatres of war the heaviest dysenteric 
death rate in B ritish  troops was probably in G a llipo li  
(a Shiga epidemic) where the Case Mortality was about 
5$ -  in other theatres, even Eastern however, i t  rarely  
exceeded 2.7%.
Russ (Berl. K lin. Wchnschr. 1918. 55) states that 
in the Austrian Army on the Isonzo front the mortality  
was 5.7% fo r Shiga.
German authorities go further and while 
Neufeld regards a mild epidemic o f Shiga as an im­
p o ss ib ility , Jochman estimates its  average mortality  
as high as 10% to 15%. In no theatre o f war did out 
experiences corroborate that estimate.
In conclusion one would add that the importance 
of dysentery from the m ilitary point o f view lie s  not 
so much in its  lethal as in its  crippling power.
It  spreads so rapidly, a ffects and incapacitates such 
large/
73.
large numbers o f men In such a comparatively short 
space o f time, that, in the Summer and Autumn in an 
endemically dysenteric area i t  is  a constant menace. 
Unfortunately too  ̂a by no means neg lig ib le  percentage 
of men affected are chronically incapacitated by i t  
from a fighting point o f view.
74
ENTERIC GROUP OP FEVERS.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
The Enteric group includes Typhoid Fever due to 
Bacillus Typhosus and the Paratyphoid Fevers due to 
Bacillus Paratyphosus A. or Bacillus Paratyphosus B.
At the beginning o f the War there was some con­
fusion as regards nomenclature but early in 1915 the 
general order was given that cases should be diagnosed 
"Enteric Group" on c lin ica l grounds pending the labor­
atory d ifferen tia tion  into Typhoid, Para A. or Para B.
This group has in previous campaigns been pro­
bably the greatest scourge of armies and even in com­
paratively  modern warfare i t  exacted a heavier to l l  
than the weapons o f the enemy.
In the South African War in which 557,653 B ritish  
sold iers were employed, there were 59,750 cases o f 
enteric with 8,227 deaths, i . e .  an incidence o f 285 
with a death rate o f 36 per 1000 average strength.
In the Spanish-American War out of 107,973 
Americans there were 20,738 cases o f enteric and 
1t 580 deaths.
In the Franco-Prussian war o f 1870-1, according 
to Bruns (Zeitschr. f .  med. beamte 1918. 31) there 
were 75,000 cases o f Typhoid Fever in the Prussian 
Army o f approximately one m illion men, whereas in  
1914-15 there were only 20,000 cases out o f a force
estimated/
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estimated as between six  and seven m illions.
The figures o f the B ritish  Army during the Great 
War o ffe r  a strik ing contrast to the experience o f 
previous campaigns -  a contrast apparent indeed in 
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TOTAL INCIDENCE OP ENTERIC GROUP.
As w i l l  be seen from accompanying table (Table 
XIV) there were 134 cases in our forward area out of 
a mean strength o f 78*477, i .e .  an annual incidence 
o f 1.54 per 1000 mean average strength.
The Base and L. o f C. reported only 8 cases, 
while Taranto was responsible fo r  34.
The Sixth Ita lian  Army fo r the 9 months o f which 
sta tis t ic s  are ava ilab le  showed 484 cases, i .e .  in ­
cidence o f 3.2 per thousand.
The French Army reported only 47 cases giving an 
incidence o f only .98 per 1000.
Perhaps the most interesting figures are those 
fo r  the Province o f Vicenza, which showed 1462 cases -  
an incidence o f 2.924 per 1000, i .e .  nearly double 
the B ritish  incidence; and i t  should be repeated again 
here, that there is  not a shadow o f doubt that only 
fa i r ly  obvious cases were reported at a l l  -  innumer­
able mild cases occurring as they did in a population 
where i t  is  endemic,and occurring under the circum­
stances o f chaos already outlined -  were never re -
•
ported at a l l .  Indeed we thought i t  could be taken 
as fa i r ly  certain that the figures fo r  the 6th Ita lian  
Army -  v iz . 3.2 per 1000 -  were probably much lower, 
occurring as they did in a protected body of men but 
under/
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under s tr ic te r  medical supervision,than the actual 
incidence among the c iv ilian s  o f that Province.
Comparing these figures with those published from 
other forces and armies, one can only remark that 
while they show a state o f a f fa ir s  admittedly fa r  from 
perfect, the wonder is  that the incidence was not fa r  
higher.
In the B ritish  Armies generally, during the 
Great War, the enteric rate was nowhere over 10 per 
1000 o f strength except in Egypt during 1916 and in 
Mesopotamia in 1916 and 1917.
Macpherson (Medical History o f the Great War) 
shows that in .53 months o f War in France during which 
the ration strength rose from 269,711 to 2,528,400 
the tota l admissions fo r enteric were 6,907 with only 
260 deaths, while during more than 4 years and in  
six  theatres o f war with an average mean ration strength 
o f approximately two m illion B rit ish  troops there were 
in a l l  only 20,149 cases o f typhoid and paratyphoid 
with 1,191 deaths.
For the fact that these figures were so low we
have to thank princ ipa lly  three measures -  prophylactic
■
inoculation, s tr ic t  water control,and elimination o f 
" c a rr ie rs " .
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TABLE XV. BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY: FORWARD AREA.
TYPHOID GROUP OF DISEASES : DEO. 1917 -  DEC. 1918 (In c lu s ive )




State o f Protect 
With T.A.B. V
ive Inoculation  
accine.









Anal y sis .
Diagnosed 
C lin ica lly  
17 $
Diagnosed at Laboratory 
83$








Deaths iCases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cages Deaths
Dec. 1917 102,183 1,313 1.3 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - -
Jan. 19IS 113,759 11,611 10.1 19,701 17.3 21 2 5 0 5 2 4 0 7 -
Feb. 113,233 10,793 9.7 10,732 9.5 14 2 4 1 4 1 3 0 3 -
March 93,050 7,569 8.1 6,172 6.6 5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 -
April 71,193 2,655 3.7 5,491 7.7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
May 71,642 3,535 4.9 5,581 7.7
6
0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 -
June 68,707 3,237 4.7 5,814 8.4 - 5 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 -
July 67,547 5,111 7.4 6,404 9.4 5 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 -
Aug. 67,500 6,746 10.0 4,035 6.1 fi 10 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 7 1
Sept. 65,286 3,525 5.3 2,570 3.9 31 3 5 0 5 1 0 0 21 2
Oct. 63,284 2,059 3.2 2,513 3.2 18 1 4 0 5 0 0 0 9 1
Nov. 63,623 547 0.9 2,806 4.4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 ~
Dec. 60,192 2,289 3.6 2 , 220 3.6 16 2 0 0 2 1 10 1 4 -





1 7.9 134 14 22 2 32 7 22 1 58 4
Case M ortality $ 10.4 9.1 21.9 4.5 6.9
Total Annual Incidence per 1000 mean average strength = 1.54
Total M ortality___________ "_____ “_____ "______ II_________H_______ = 0.16
TABLE XVI ♦ SIXTH ITALIAN ARMY (ASTAGO FRONT).
(Excluding the attached French & British Troops)
TYPHOID GROUP "OF DISEASES : APRIL -  DECEMBER 1918 (In c lus ive ) 









C lin ica lly
(3.7$)
Diagnosed at Labor 
(96.3$)
’atory
Enteric Group 1Typhoid Fever Paratyphoid ‘A 1 Paratyphoid !B 1
Oases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
April 195,000 38 6 2
S’o
24 6 7 - 5





40 1 2 - 4 1
June 196,141 37 2 1
»
rH in
O  ©  
•H ©
25 1 6 1 5
July 204,961 44 13 3
©
inc6 tH_
38 13 2 - 1
August 203,074 113 15 -
Ph A  
8 £
98 14 7 - 8 1
September 204,926 120 14 6
C3 ' Bo o
•ri Jh
95 13 9 - 10 1
October 199,996 25 6 -
t-l >H ©
•P ©
19 6 4 mm 2
November 214,292 32 2 -
06B ©  
o  TJ
22 1 5 1 5












377 56 46 2 43 3
Case Mortal! by $ 12.63 14.17 14.17 4.3 7.0
Total Annual Incidence per 1000 Mean Average Strength = 5»2
________H M ortality_______ w w " _________ w = 0.4
TABLE XVII• E __N T E R I 0 G R 0 U P
















Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths
January - - - - 13 1359
February - ~ - - 22 994
March - - - - 9 1098
April 38 6 5 - 11 1176
May 51 2 3 - 24 H 1378 w
June 37 2 1 2 31 1890
July 44 13 5 - 123 0■V
2607 0<
August 113 15 17 - 574 7271
September 120 14 7 - 523 f-l 10,717 £-i
October 25 6 1 1 110 oÎZ 3064 o&
November 32 2 6 1 13 1268
December 24 1 2 1 9 823
Totals 484 61 47 5 1462 33,705









RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF TYPHOID AND PARATYPHOID.
Before re ferring to the tables i t  is  necessary 
to point out once more that the value of sta tis tics  
in diarrhoeal diseases is  much vitiated  by the large  
percentage o f cases diagnosed c lin ic a lly  only, but 
as w i l l  be seen here the percentage of laboratory 
findings is  higher than was often procurable.
TABLE XV
In the Forward Area out o f the 134 cases; 112 
or 83$ were diagnosed bacterio logically  and 





The VIth Ita lia n  Army show 466 (96.3$) diag­




The French and C iv ilians were unfortunately unable to 
supply d iffe ren t ia l diagnoses with any certainty 
(Table X V III).
The only point one can note  ̂but cannot explain 
here^ is  the re la t iv e ly  large amount o f Typhoid in the 
VI th/
83.
VIth Ita lian  Army as compared with Paratyphoid -  a 
state of a f fa ir s  vrtiich was rare even in their Army, 
and p ractica lly  -unknown in any o f our Armies in any 
theatre of war.
In the B.E.F. Prance, fo r  the whole war period, 
Typhoid was responsible fo r approximately one h a lf o f 
the cases while in Ita ly  i t  was responsible fo r  one 
third, and in  other theatres of war among our troops 
the proportion was usually  less than one quarter.
In Ita ly  as in France among our troops at anyrate 
Paratyphoid B was about three times as frequent as 
Paratyphoid A,while in Salonika, Egypt and Mesopotamia 
Para A was much the commoner infection.
At the outbreak o f war Typhoid fever was endemic 
in every theatre: Paratyphoid B was very rare in 
England but fa ir ly  common on the continent, while 
Paratyphoid A was p ractica lly  unknown except in the 
East and it s  sporadic occurrence in England and France 
was correlated by Galambos (Zeitschr. f .  k lin . med.
1917. 84) with colonial possessions.
Macpherson (History o f the Great War) points out 
that, such being the case, typhoid would probably 
appear f i r s t  in the B.E.P. Prance, closely followed  
by Paratyphoid B acquired lo ca lly , and that Paratyphoi 
A would be delayed un til contact was established with 
troops who had served in the East or with French 
colonial/
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colonial troops from A frica . And this is  just what 
the sequence o f events turned out to he.
Galamhos likewise (loc . c i t . )  states that in the 
f i r s t  year o f war there were only a few cases of 
Paratyphoid A among German troops on the Western front 
during the second year cases became more numerous, 
especially  on the Eastern front, and by December 1916 
he computed that i t  was responsible fo r 75$ of cases 
in some epidemics. By 1918 Paratyphoid A was firm ly  
established in the Central Empires and Lehmann (M&nch. 
med. Wchnschr. 1917. 64) agrees with Galambos that its  
presence there was due to the large in flux  of black 
prisoners from Morocco via the French Army.
Muller (Munch, med. Wchnschr. 1918. 65) and 
likewise His (Berl. K lin. Wchnschr. 1918. 55) both 
drew attention to the fact that Paratyphoid Fever is  
much commoner than Typhoid at Constantinople, even 
in peace time.
At various times in  1916-17, epidemics o f Para­
typhoid A occurred on Eastern and S.E. fronts among 
the German troops, ch iefly  in Galicia, the Bukovina 
and Wolhynia. Epidemics also occurred in Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Macedonia.
In the Austrian Army too, Sternberg (Beitr. z. 
path. Anat. u. z. a l lg .  Path. 1918. 64) reported a 
severe epidemic o f Paratyphoid with a mortality of 
4.2$/
4.2$ fo r A type and 3.5$ fo r B type.
Tschipeff and Fllirst (Deutsch. med. Wchnschr.
1918* 44) described an epidemic o f enteric among the 
c iv i l  population o f the Dobrudsha with a preponderance 
o f Paratyphoid A.
MORTALITY.
Reference to TABLES XV, XVI and XVII 
shows the Total Mortality to be .16 per 1000 and the 
Case M ortality fo r the Group to be 10.4$, made up as 




The VIth Ita lia n  Army shows a total mortality o f 0.4 
per 1000 and a Case M ortality fo r the Group o f 12.63$ 




Again i t  is  to be regretted that figures fo r an 
analysis o f the other sta tis tics  are not available , 
but the Case Mortality among the French (10.6$) 
corresponds with ours.
While our figures compare quite favourably with 
those/
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those o f the Italian. Army o f v/hich we formed a part, 
they are by no means good as compared with the B ritish  
Armies in France in 1918. During the period under 






East A frica 28.4$
Case Mortality in 
B ritish  Troops 
fo r Enteric Group.
The only explanation one can o ffe r  is  the known 
tendency o f the disease to be worse in hot climates^ 
and that, combined with the sojourn in an area hope­
le ss ly  overcrowded with a heavily infected population, 
seems to be the only cause fo r  the re la tive ly  high 
death rate.
The re la tive  m ortalities o f Para A and B appear 
to show that in Ita ly7 at this period at anyrate., Para 
B was the more severe infection, but the general 
trend in other theatres o f war, according to 




In the introduction to Diarrhoeal Diseases 
the general administrative measures of hygiene and 
sanitation enforced have "been already touched on, but 
in dealing with the Enteric group one would lik e  to 
re fe r  more particu larly  to what was our main line of 
defence against this enemy -  I re fe r to prophylactic 
inoculation.
As has already been stated, we never ceased to 
impress on a l l  ranks the necessity o f inoculation and 
re-inoculation, and in th is connection it  should be 
remembered that, though vaccination is  obligatory in 
our Army,, inoculation is  not, while i t  was so in the 
A llied  armies. The measure of success attained is  
demonstrated in TABLE XV, which shows that during the 
whole o f 1918 inoculations or re-inoculations were 
being carried out at the rate o f from over 10 thousand 
per mensem in January to over 2 thousand in December -  
during the year the percentage o f men who had not been 
inoculated fo r  12 months f e l l  from 17.3$ in January 
to 3.8$ in December.
The tr ip le  vaccine (brought in in 1913) was in­
variably  used, containing 1000 m illion B Typhosus and 
750 m illion each o f Paratyphosus A and B. Two in­
jections were given at an interval of 8 to 10 days -  
the f i r s t  dose being 0.5 cc. and the second 1.0 cc.




In a l l  theatres o f war it  was de fin ite ly  proved 
that i t  lowers enormously not only the incidence but 
the morbidity.
TABLE XXIV
shows the state o f inoculation of cases admitted from 
the Enteric group, v iz . 67*4$ of a l l  cases admitted 
had been inoculated within the preceding 12 months 
and this group of men constituted as has been shown in 
TABLE XV
an average o f 92.1$ o f the whole force, while the 
7.9$ o f the whole force who had not been inoculated fo 
12 months produced 32.5$ o f the admissions.
The experience o f the B ritish  Armies was confirm­
ed in a l l  other Armies which adopted this measure.
Blum and Voisin (Ann. d'hyg. 1917. 28) showed 
that enteric fever in the French Army had undergone 
a complete modification since the beginning of war 
inasmuch as the symptoms, while the same in kind, 
became much milder than they were before the war and 
during the f i r s t  few months o f h o s t ilit ie s . This 
change was the resu lt o f the influence of inoculation. 
At the outbreak o f war the French troops were not 
protected and grave cases of enteric with high mort­
a lity  occurred. But from the beginning o f 1915,.by 
which time inoculation had been carried out, the type 
o f disease had changed and became much milder.
Musehold/
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Musehold (Deutsch. m il.-a r tz l. Ztschr. 1918» 47) 
gives an a rt ic le  on anti-typhoid inoculation in the 
German Army based on his observations made from April 
1915 on the Eastern front.
He found that in A p ril, May and June 1915 enteric 
was fa i r ly  prevalent among the troops who were in a 
part o f Poland where the disease was r i fe ,  and among 
those affected were a large number who had never been 
inoculated.
Inoculation was delayed, owing to m ilitary exigen­
cies, un til July. Admissions to hospital were as 
follows -  1.38 in A p ril, 1.50 in May and 2.1 in June 
(per 1000). In July, a fter inoculation was carried  
out? the incidence dropped to .94 in August, .65 in 
September and .47 in December. Inoculation was again 
carried out in December and as a result there was a 
further drop to .28 in February and .05 in May (of 
1916). There was a s ligh t r ise  in July and August 
to .12 and .14 coincident with a prevalence o f Dysentery. 
A fter further inoculation had been carried out in June, 
July and December 1916 and again in January and August 
o f 1917 the enteric incidence in the Army decreased 
so much that from September 1917 the admissions for  
enteric were below the best peace-time figures.
He found the mortality in inoculated was 2,1% 
when inoculation had taken place in the previous six  
months, as compared with 10.1% when it  was longer.
Hunerman/
Hunerman placed the mortality among uninoculated 
at 9.6$ and so the Germans considered that re-inocula­
tion should be six-monthly.
The Ita lian  authorities in December 1915 came to 
the conclusion that owing to the absence o f Paratyphoid 
A fever a bivalent vaccine against Typhoid and Para­
typhoid B only was necessary: they also considered 
that a t r ip le  vaccine would cause too violent a re ­
action. Their idea was fa ls i f ie d  and contact with
other infected troops soon produced Paratyphoid A 
fever in their armies and the follow ing excerpts bring  
out the point exceedingly c learly .
Galeotti and Bruno (Sperimentale Arch, di Biolog. 
1917-18. 71) give a report on a series o f 1,007 cases 
o f suspected enteric in an Ita lian  Army.
Of these 130 ( i .e .  13$) were negative to a l l  examina­
tions,
While in 459 (or 46$) agglutination tests only were
carried out and so are excluded.,
this leaves 418 (or 41$) which were diagnosed bacterio-
lo g ic a lly  as fo llow s: -
Paratyphoid A -  172 (or 41.1$)
Paratyphoid B -  101 (or 24.2$)
Paratyphoid but doubtful -  69 (or 16.5$)
Typhoid -  76 (18.1$)
In this epidemic then Paratyphoid A predominated and
*
they state that as their experience in this epidemic 
was corroborated by colleagues in other Armies i t  was 
obvious/
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obvious that the predominance was due to the use of 
the bivalent vaccine. They also pointed out that 
Paratyphoid A and the undetermined paratyphoids were 
more frequent among the inoculated than among the 
uninoculated re la t iv e ly .
Crossonini also in the same periodical (sperimen- 
ta le . Arch, di B io lo g .) reports on a further group o f 
cases in the Gorizia sector from Dec. 1915 to Feb.1917 
which made the point even c lea re r:-
Out o f 944 suspected cases o f enteric
441 were negative to a l l  examinations 
i .e .  503 positive cases -  made up as follows 
Typhoid 21$: Paratyphoid A 45$: Paratyphoid B 34$.
But these percentages were not constant throughout 
the period o f investigation.
From Dec. 1915 to July 1916 -  208 cases
38$ Typhoid 
6$ Paratyphoid A 
56$ Paratyphoid B
From Aug. 1916 to Feby. 1917 -  295 cases
9$ Typhoid 
73$ Paratyphoid A 
18$ Paratyphoid B
This remarkable change in percentage incidence, whereby 
Paratyphoid A became responsible fo r 73$ o f the cases, 
is  correlated with a re-inoculation o f that Army 
carried out in the f i r s t  h a lf o f 1916 by a bivalent 
vaccine against Typhoid and Paratyphoid B and a further 
investigation/
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investigation by Crossonini o f 458 cases produced the 
fo llow ing facts *-
162 cases among men completely re-inoculated with the 
bivalent vaccine (3 in jections) produced -
6$ Typhoid 
84$ Paratyphoid A 
9$ Paratyphoid B
296 cases among non-inoculated or incompletely 
inoculated men produced -
28$ Typhoid 
25$ Paratyphoid A 
47$ Paratyphoid B
So that in a body o f men completely inoculated against 
Typhoid and Paratyphoid B, 84$ o f the cases o f enteric 
group admitted were on account o f Paratyphoid A -  the 
one member of the group against which they were not 
protected: while in another body wholly or partly  
unprotected the incidence o f a l l  three members of the 
group was more nearly equal.
APPENDIX.
The Appendix to this Thesis is  a tracing 
o f an Ita lia n  o f f ic ia l  map o f the Province of Vicenza 
subdivided into Its  communes, and has been drawn up 
as a “ spot map" showing the monthly notifications of 
c iv ilian  cases o f Enteric and Dysentery in each 
affected commune.
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C H O L E R A .
GENERAL.
This particu lar member of the group o f 
Diarrhoeal Diseases did not occur during the stay o f  
the B rit ish  Forces in Ita ly , although in 1918 it  had 
caused considerable havoc in the Ita lian  Army,there 
being over 14,000 cases with a mortality o f 48$.
The Ita lian s  became infected from the Austro-Hungarian 
Army, which had become affected primarily in Galicia  
in September 1914, and by September 1915 had had 
26,000 cases with 15,000 deaths. The Austrian troops 
were also probably responsible fo r the great Serbian 
epidemic.
The B ritish  Armies, in spite of operating in many
theatres o f war where the disease was endemic, only
became affected in Mesopotamia (2,852 cases) and 
«
Sinai (28 cases).
P rio r to the la st offensive the Austro-Hungarians 
made against our Asiago front in June 1918, we re­
ceived reports from various sources -  spies, prisoners 
and enemy deserters -  that Cholera had by no means 
died out in the enemy armies and indeed that another 
outbreak was expected.
As we fe lt  confident that the Austrians would 
probably have to attack our positions in conformity 
with the great German offensive then going on in France 
and/
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and Flanders^, we at once acted on this information with 
a view to examining a l l  Austrian prisoners we might 
take, fo r  latent cholera.
The steps we took were the construction o f a 
large new prisoners’ cage through which,orders were 
issued, a l l  prisoners o f war must pass.
The cage consisted o f a large receiving yard 
divided into pens each capable of holding SO prisoners 
or thereabouts, and another large yard -  likewise 
subdivided into pens, from which the prisoners, a fter  
examination, could be distributed to the various 
prisoner-of-war camps. Between the receiving and 
distributing yards was a passage flanked by two covered 
in and suitably fitted -up  laboratories, each capable 
of accomodating one or more bacterio logists with their 
s t a f f s .
A ll  prisoners were kept in the receiving yard 
until recta l swabs were taken and reported on, and 
only a fter being declared negative were they passed 
through to the d istributing yard fo r disposal.
The enemy attack developed early on the morning 
o f June 15th and a fte r  fighting a l l  day and on the 16th 
our lin e  was completely restored and the enemy defin­
ite ly  beaten. During this operation we captured 
1,060 prisoners, a l l  o f whom were passed through the 
special cage described.
Although no cases o f cholera were discovered,
the/
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the bacterio logists discovered quite a few cases of 
latent dysentery among these prisoners and so the 




M A L A R I A
Dec. Jan. Feb . March A pril May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
British Force in Ita ly










0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 10 7 11 2 37
512 4 4 2 0 9 10 5 10 3 2 0 0
British Force in Ita ly  £ 
Base & L. of G .  ^
io
Mean Strength o 
17,809
•
0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 7 5 2 4 0 22
169311 5 10 26 24 38 20 13 6 8 3 2
"d






4 7 18 11 11 6 3 60
9067 30 61 59 37 106 83 143 99 102 7! 74 34
T )
VIth Ita lian  Army h*
a•
Mean Strength ® 
201,389 §
•
1 2 1 147 94 117 24 0 1 387
131283 160 94 298 246 236 109 82 4
French Army in Ita ly  £
•
w
Mean Strength ® 
48,000 £
•
17 29 3 0 1 50
12512 15 10 20 38 22 3 2 3
Province o f Vicenza NO1]’ NC5TIFIEE .
Kingdom of Ita ly NOT NOTIFIED.
_____________1_____________ i________ 1______________
r
M A L A R I A .
INCIDENCE DURING THE GREAT WAR.
B rit ish  Forces.
To rea lize  the tremendously crippling effects o f 
malaria on modern armies^ one has only to look at the 
admission figures fo r  this disease alone in the 
B ritish  Expeditionary Forces, scattered as they were 
to the four points o f the compass.
In Macedonia the tota l admissions during 1916, 
1917 and 1918 reached approximately 160,000: in Egypt 
about 35,000; in East A frica  107,000; and in Meso­
potamia about SO,000, -  according to MacPherson.
Other places such as the Cameroons, German S.W. 
A frica , France, Ita ly  and even England i t s e l f ,  yielded 
their quota though in comparison the figures may be 
in sign ifican t.
And that these figu res, appalling as they may be, 
do not indicate the rea l number affected, appears to 
be borne out by the fact that in over 100 autopsies 
performed in Macedonia fo r deaths from Influenzal 
Broncho-pneumonia, 83$ showed defin ite malarial 
pigmentation in the spleen without there being any 
active malaria.
Other Forces.
The other combatant powers experienced the same 
crippling/
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crippling effects as did B rita in , and the opinion 
expressed early in the war by Castellani (Archiv. med. 
beiges) that no disease would cause heavier losses was 
amply ju s tified  when s ta tis t ic s  ultimately became 
ava ilab le .
T i r e l l i  (G ior. di med. mel. 1918. 66) states that 
from December 1915 to the end o f March 1918* 239,556 
cases of malaria occurred among the A llied  Troops in  
Macedonia alone, o f which 46.45$ were among B ritish  
Troops while 29.00$ were among the French, 16.73$ 
among Serbs and 7.15$ among the Ita lian s .
M alaria, which had been extinct fo r  some time in 
Flanders, re-appeared as a consequence of the flooding 
o f the country in the attempt to res is t  the German 
advance and thus recalled  the disastrous Walcheren 
expedition o f 1809.
In France and Germany too, and even in England, 
the return home o f numerous men infected with malaria 
aroused much anxiety.
In Rumania malaria has long been endemic in the 
low -lying country round the Danube -  the average pre­
war number o f Rumanians treated in hospital fo r malaria 
being about 7000 annually.
Regendanz (Archiv. f .  Schiffs u. Tropen. Hyg.
1918. 22 .) examined several hundred Rumanian children 
during a non-malarial part o f the year (April -  May) 
and found 1 to 2$ were carrie rs . As a natural sequence 
by/
by July Malaria was common among German troops operat­
ing there, though incidentally  he mentions that there 
were no cases o f Blackwater Fever in spite o f quinine 
therapy.
In Bulgaria too Kayser-Peterson (Munch, med. 
Wchnschr. 1918. 05) reported on the prevalence o f 
malaria -  the German admission rate there ris ing  from 
.17 to .8 per 1000 in the second year o f war. But 
here Seyfarth (Berl. K lin . Wchnschr. 1918* 55) reported 
also Blaclcwater Fever.
ftIn Turkey likewise Muller (Zentralb l. f .  innere 
med. 1918. 39.) reported on its  prevalence and His 
declared that i t  was the principal disease in that 
country. He also reports that in  spite o f the d i f ­
ferent climatic conditions prevailing, the time o f 
it s  appearance among German troops in Flanders, Poland 
and the Balkans was the same.
German Army s ta tis t ic s  fo r the f i r s t  three years 
o f war showed that malaria shared with cerebro-spinal 
fever the unenviable notoriety o f being one of the 
only two diseases to show an increase -  the incidence 
per 1000 ris in g  from .16 in the f i r s t  year of war to 
4.2 in  the third year. Russ, in discussing the 
prevalence of malaria among the Austrians on the 
Ita lia n  Isonzo Front, declared that the “mosquito- 
destroying detachments“ could do very l i t t l e  as every 
shell-ho le  a fte r  r a in fa ll became a breeding-ground 
fo r  mosquitos.
99.
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Malaria In I t a ly .
The malaria problem in Ita ly , as fa r  as our 
troops were concerned, presented i t s e l f  in the forward 
area and the Taranto base ch iefly , and on the L. o f 
C. to a less extent.
Forward Area.
In the front line there was very l i t t l e  Malaria 
amongst B ritish  Troops and what l i t t l e  there was 
tended to occui? as w il l  be seen from Table XVIII, 
at the la tte r  end of the year when two divisions le ft  
the healthy Asiago Plateau and went down to the Piave 
to take part in the fin a l assault.
In the forward area we had 37 cases of Primary 
and 51 cases o f Recurrent Malaria fo r  the year, as 
compared with the French figures o f 50 and 125» and 
the Vlth Ita lia n  Army figures o f 387 and 1312.
C iv ilian  figures are not availab le  as it  is  not a 
n o tifiab le  disease in Ita ly .
What might have happened, had our stay on the 
lower marshy reaches o f the Piave been prolonged, i t  
is  d i f f ic u lt  to say. A half-hearted attempt was made 
to institu te quinine prophylaxis but the move was so 
rapid and the advance so ligh tn ing-like that i t  is  
very doubtful whether many units ever had a chance o f 
getting any quinine at a l l  -  i t  was almost impossible 
to/
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to get up bare rations, le t  alone anything else.
But that the danger we were exposed to was very rea l, 
the malaria figures fo r  the 3rd Ita lia n  Army on our 
right -  operating in the delta o f the Piave -  show; 
they had 4,443 primary and 1,318 relapse cases.
L. o f 0 .
On the lines o f communication through Ita ly  to 
Taranto i t  was proved that anopheles invaded the trains 
at many o f the stopping places, but to what extent 
could not be gauged. Attempts were made to regulate 
the stopping-places and to mosquito-proof the trains, 
but both were found impracticable.
Taranto.
At Taranto the troops exposed to infection, 
apart from troops passing through» numbered approxi­
mately 1,570 in 1917 and amongst these there were 
220 cases o f primary malaria* The infection rate was 
14$. But in the case o f one native labour company 
the rate rose to 35$.
Troops on 'their way to Egypt and Salonika were 
usually  put up at Taranto camp fo r a varying number 
o f days and complaints soon aroBe that malaria in­
fection  was taking place there. As a resu lt r ig id  
enquiries were instituted and a competent entomologist 
was detailed to co llect anophelines, daily collections 
being made in two areas, one inside the camp and 
one/
one outside. The f i r s t  week’ s collection showed 
53 anophelines in the camp and 531 in the outer area. 
As a resu lt o f vigorous anti-mosquito measures adopted 
in 1918 and 1919 -  mosquito-proofing, drainage and o il  
sprinkling -  the numbers o f anophelines collected  
gradually fe l l ,  u n til in 1919, so free did the camp 
become, that the prophylactic U3e o f quinine and the 
use o f mosquito-nets were discontinued.
The prevalent mosquito was A. Maculipennis which 
came ch iefly  from ditches and marshes to the south 
and east o f the camp, while A. Bifurcatus was found 
to the west and bred in troughs and wells principally .
Appendix.
The Appendix to this Thesis is  an o f f ic ia l  
map o f the Province o f Vicenza sub-divided into its  
communes and showing in addition to the Enteric and 
Dysentery returns, the m alarial zones o f the province.
TABLE XIX. OEREBRO-SPINAL FEVER.
Dec. Jan. Feb. iarch A pril May Tune July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
British Force in Ita ly  




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
British Force in Ita ly  
(Taranto) 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7
VIth Ita lian  Army 




- - - - 7 4 0 1 S 0 0 0 1 15
French Army in Ita ly
Mean Strength 
48,000
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Province o f Vicenza
Population
500,000
- - - - - - - - - afc - -
Kingdom of Ita ly
Population
35,000,000
155 s s s 315 S49 S85 174 77 50 2© 18 10 35 1618
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OEREBRO-SPINAL FEVER.
I*n view of the fact that from 1914 to 1918 this 
disease was epidemic among troops in the United 
Kingdom, while a concurrent heavy incidence affected  
the c iv i l  population -  in view too of the fact that 
the incidence was known to be fa ir ly  heavy in Ita ly  
we kept a s tr ic t  watch fo r Oerebro-Spinal fever in 
the B rit ish  Forces in Ita ly .
But as the TABLE XIX 
shows  ̂ the Incidence was comparatively ligh t among our 
troops, the Forward Area showing only 6 cases fo r the 
year while our Base and L. o f C. only reported one 
case. Taranto had 7 cases.
In the VTth Ita lian  Army there were 15 cases 
but in the Province o f Vicenza there were none at 
a l l  -  a state of a f fa ir s  contrasting markedly with 
the figures fo r  the whole Kingdom of Ita ly , v iz . 1618.
Small as the figures from the war zone are, 
they show, as do the figures fo r the whole of Ita ly , 
a seasonal incidence exactly p a ra lle l with that noted 
in the United Kingdom where 77% o f the cases occurred 
in the f i r s t  6 months o f the year. From January 
the number o f cases gradually increase t i l l  March 
when the maximum is  reached, and from the end o f June 
re la t iv e ly  few cases appear t i l l  December when the 
number rises  again.
As/
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As regards Aetiology most countries have been 
v is ited  so climate does not appear to play any special 
ro le . Weather conditions, previous illn e s s , and 
naso-pharyngeal catarrh have a l l  been advanced as 
predisposing factors without much corroborative 
evidence to support such assumptions, and while Dopter 
considers that cold and fatigue predispose,this cannot 
be said to have been proved.
Only one factor seems to have been defin ite ly  
proved as causative, namely, overcrowding,and Glover 
(M.R.C. London 1918 and J l. o f R.A.M.C. 1918. Vol.XXX) 
found that the carrie r rate rarely  exceeded 5$ when 
a standard distance of one yard between beds was 
maintained in camps. With one foot four inches be­
tween beds the carrie r rate rose to 10$: at one foot 
to 20$ and at less than 9 inches to 28 or 30$.
When the carrie r rate rose to 20$ or over, cases began 
to occur.
In the absence o f records concerning Cerebro-spinal 
fever in previous wars in which the disease may have 
passed unrecognised,or possibly been confused with 
other conditions, Dopter's summary of its  incidence 
in the French Army (B u ll. Acad, de Med. 1918. 79) is  
o f Interest. He states that generally speaking i t  
was not very common but there were
in 1915 -  1073 cases or 4.2 per 10,000
1916 -  451 " " 1.8 " w
1917 409 ” 1.5 H "
He/
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He considers that it s  power of spreading was low, 
probably due to open a ir  l i f e  and freedom from close 
contact, and pointed out that i t  was not on the whole 
epidemic but that the cases tended to be widely 
separated with occasional small groups of 6 to 8 cases.
As regards the German Army, Galambos 
(Kriegsepidemiologische Erfahrungen 1917) says that 
though sporadic cases o f cerebro-spinal fever occurred 
in a l l  the theatres o f war, i t  never assumed epidemic 
proportions anywhere.
In the Austrian Army, though figures of total 
incidence are not available, the mortality on the Isonzo 
front at any rate appears to have been high, v iz . -  
50$ according to Russ (Berl. K lin. Wchnschr. 1918.55).
In the United Kingdom from 1914 to 1918 there 
were 4,238 cases among the m ilitary and 6,021 cases 
among the c iv i l  population with m ortalities of 45.5$ 
and 65.0$ respectively.
In the B ritish  Expeditionary Force in France, 
where i t  f i r s t  appeared in January 1915, there were 
from then t i l l  1918 a tota l of 1583 cases with a 
mortality of 34$.
*
TABLE XX. TUBERCULOSIS - PULMONARY.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March A pril May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




8 18 9 7 7 5 10 4 2 4 6 3 2 81
British Force in Ita ly .  
Base & L. o f C.
Mean strength 
17,809
0 3 0 3 3 4 1 2 3 3 3 2 0 27
British Force in Ita ly . 
Taranto.
1 0 2 2 6 2 1 8 11 4 8 5 10 60
Vlth Ita lian  Army
Mean strength 
201,389
15 16 16 21 18 20 14- 12 7 139
NOT NfOTIFIABLE IN FRENCH ARMY N ITALY NOR AMONG CIVIL]:ans .
TABLE XXI » P N E U M O N I A .




25 32 19 22 8 13 17 4 5 3 13 10 2 173
British Force in Ita ly  
Base & L. of C.
Mean strength 
17,809
3 3 3 2 0 4 1 3 0 8 27 2 0 56
British Force in Ita ly  
Taranto. 0 39 39 10 4 9 0 5 7 5 12 7 9 146
PNEUMONIA IS NOT NOTIFIED IN ITALIAN OR FRENCH ARMIES 
NOR AMONG CIVILIAN POPULATION.
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Reference to TABLE XX shows that this condition 
was responsible fo r  an appreciable and fa ir ly  steady 
drain on the effectives o f our troops, the greater 
incidence corresponding with the more trying weather 
prevailing at the beginning o f the year.
No figures are availab le  fo r the c iv ilian  popu­
lation  so that comparisons can hardly be drawn.
A ll the same the tota l numbers in both our and 
the Ita lia n  troops o f the Sixth Army bear out the 
experience o f both the French and German Armies which 
was that war caused a great increase in Tuberculosis. 
But while some authorities held that wounds and gassing 
markedly predisposed to Tuberculosis, others, and the 
majority indeed, held that there was no defin ite  
causal relationship^ but that war conditions acted only 
ind irectly  by ligh ting up previous infections or 
deb ilita ting  the individual.
Grossberger (Miinch. med. Wchnschr. 1917.64) 
records the cases of five  soldiers who, though free  
from personal or family history o f Tuberculosis,
developed the pulmonary type fa ta lly  a fter prolonged
•
suppuration from gunshot wounds o f bone, and he com­
pares the sequence with Tuberculosis following measles 
or whooping cough and regards i t  as the lighting up
TUBERCULOSIS PULMONARY.
o f a latent infection.
Sorgo also (Wien. med. Wchnschr. 1917. 77) 
defines “War Tuberculosis" as the activation of a 
previously latent infection or the acceleration o f a 
Tuberculosis already active at the time o f enlistment.
In Austria a fte r  the second year of war the in ­
crease o f Tuberculosis among both c iv ilian s and 
m ilitary was very marked, Von Jaksch from his necropsies 
quoting an increase from 15$ in 1915 to 32% in 1916 
among the m ilitary , while Weichselbaum (Wien. med. 
Wchnschr. 1918. 68) states that among the c iv ilian  
population o f Vienna the deaths from Tuberculosis rose 
from 6»223 in 1914 to 9>551 in 1916, and remarks that 
that increase was general throughout Austria.
The same grave state o f a f fa ir s  emerged in Germany and 
Weber (Berl. K lin. Wchnschr. 1919. 56) showed that in 
Berlin  alone 49.5%« more people died o f pulmonary and 
laryngeal tuberculosis in 1917 than in 1913 to 1916.
While the "blockade" doubtless affected the
'
Central Empires more than i t  did the A llie s , s t i l l  
the increase appears to have been general, as was 
indeed to be expected from the conditions under which 
the war was carried out.
Thus in Ita ly  Ronzoni (Gior. di med. mil. 1917.
65) stated that, judging from the cuti-reaction, about 
75$ o f sold iers have Tuberculosis but o f those who 
give a positive reaction only about 20$ showed c lin ica l 
signs. He summarizes the position probably fa ir ly  
accurately when he states that though war does not /
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not create tuberculosis the term "war tuberculosis" 
may be used inasmuch as war reveals, in tensifies and 
aggravates the disease.
P N E U M O N I A .
Reference to TABLE XXI shows that this also 
was a fa ir ly  constant drain on the troops -  the 
maximum occurring here too in the f i r s t  quarter as 
would be expected. As the condition is  not noti­
f ia b le  in any o f the other groups of human beings 
under consideration, no useful information appears 
deducible.
table XXII. D I P H T H E R  I A.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June Tuly Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




4 -12 18 11 15 10 3 30 20 5 6 3 4 141
British Force in Ita ly  




0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 1 13
British Force in Ita ly  
Taranto. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 10
VI th Ita lian  Army




0 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 9
French Army in Ita ly .
Mean strength 
48,000
11 5 3 0 1 0 3 2 1 26
Province o f Vicenza.
Population
500,000
65 102 74 53 35 27 38 57 56 42 15 20 584
Kingdom o f Ita ly .
Population 
35,000,000.
1674 2142 2121 1403 1246 1348 959 1278 2084 1215 891 949 17,310
112.
D I P H T H E R I A .
Reference to TABLE XXII shows a somewhat un­
usual state of a f fa ir s ,  v iz . a considerable number of 
cases in our forward area, 141 fo r the year, while the 
French and Ita lia n  Troops in the same area were but 
l i t t l e  affected. The cases were spread over the 
whole year with, as is  usual, the maximum in the cold 
season un til the month o f July when we had 30 cases 
and a further 20 in August. Our Base and L. of 0. 
troops were re la tiv e ly  unaffected and even the c iv ilian  
figures are in no wise out o f the ordinary. In this 
connection it  w il l  be noted that the re lative  in ­
cidence per month coincided fa ir ly  closely with our 
experience, i . e .  maximums in February followed by 
marked rises at the end o f the third quarter of the 
year.
Comparative s ta tis tic s  fo r other theatres of war 
are not availab le  and information is  re la tive ly  scanty, 
but Labit (Arch, de med. et de pharm. mel. 1917. 67) 
drew attention to the fact that in Touraine where 
Diphtheria is  always present and where indeed 
Bretonneau and Trousseau did their orig inal work, there 
was an outbreak in 1915 among the troops with 1450 
cases and 26 deaths, the greatest incidence being in 
September when there were 320 cases, representing 3$ 
o f the e ffectives. During 1916 and 1917 also con­
siderable/
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considerable numbers were affected, but by that time 
the danger was fu lly  rea lized  and prophylactic measures 
minimised the numbers.
From the c lin ica l point o f view i t  was frequently  
observed during the war that Enteric Fever and 
Diphtheria were not seldom combined, e.g. Rathery at 
the Zuydcoote Hospital saw 109 cases o f Diphtheria 
among 4,198 cases o f Enteric and noted that the prog­
nosis in these cases is  grave (29$ m ortality ).
table XXIII . SCARLET FEVER
1917 1918
Dec. Jan. Feb. March A pril May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




7 22 9 7 5 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
•
58
British Force in Ita ly  
Base & L. o f C.
Mean strength 
17,809
0 2 2 1 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 2 0 15
British Force in Ita ly  
Taranto. 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
VIth Ita lian  Army.
Mean strength 
201,389
3 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 17
French Army in Ita ly
Mean strength 
48,000
4 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 12
Province o f Vicenza
Population
500,000
16 9 10 8 19 10 7 3 22 3 0 0 107
Kingdom of Ita ly
Population
35,000,000
752 700 807 718 782 877 567 554 840 406 254 344 7,601
TABLE XXIV » BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY : DEC. 1917 -  DEO. 1910 (Inc lu s iv e ).
FORWARD AREA, BASE & L. o f 0. (TARANTO excluded)"
TYPHOID GROUP OF DISEASES & SCARLET FEVER : COMPARATIVE TABLES SHOWING STATE OF ANTI-TYPHOID
INOCULATION OF CASES ADMITTED.
Interv al (in  months) elapsing since la st  Inoculation with T.A.B. VacOine. Over Inoc *n 
Refus *d.
No
Inform7? To ta ls1 2 3 4 5 6 7 -8 9 10 11 12 15 18 24 36 36
Forward 
TYPHOID Area. 2 3 11 3 7 9 15
12 5 5 9 5 16 9 3 4 5 3 8 134
GROUP Base &
L. of C. 1 1 1 1 ' 1 . 1 2 8
Totals 2 3 11 3 7 9 15 13 6 6 9 5 17 9 3 4 6 4 10 142
Forward 
SCARLET Area. 2 2 1 4 3 2 2 5 2 2 1 1 9 1 1 1 - - 19 58
Base &
L . o f C. 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 2 15
Totals 2 2 1 5 3 4 2 8 3 2 2 4 10 1 2 1 - 21 73
ANALYSIS OF CASES ADMITTED WHERE DATE OF ANTI-TYPHOID INOCULATION IS AVAILABLE.
Period elapsing since date of Anti-Typhoid Inoculation.
6 months & under 7 - 1 2  months Total Over 12 months Never Inoculated Totals
12 months & under
TYPHOID Cases 35 54 89 39 4 132GROUP Percentage 26.5$ 40.9$ 67.4$ 29.5$ 3.0$
SCARLET Cases 17 21 38 14 52
FEVER. Percentage 32.7$ 20.4$ 73.1$ 26.9$
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SCARLET FEVER.
The number of Scarlet Fever cases was not great 
among any o f the troops and out o f a total o f 58 cases 
in our own forward area 22 occurred in the month o f 
January 1918 -  a small epidemic patch.
But from the epidemiological point o f view the 
figures given in TABLE XXIII tend to bring out 
a somewhat interesting though decidedly controversial 
point.
Ker (Infectious Diseases 1920, page 593) in d is­
cussing the co-existence o f infectious diseases states 
"The enteric patient, onvthe other hand, almost seems 
to possess some degree o f immunity towards that disease 
(Scarlet Fever)." And again (loc . c it . page 594)
" I t  is  a curious fac t, however, that none o f the 
hundreds o f susceptible children who have passed 
through our enteric wards have ever contracted scar­
la tin a  in their convalescence."
Now i t  w i l l  be seen from TABLES VT & XXIII 
that apart from 3 cases (which incidentally occurred 
in the f i r s t  week o f October) no cases of Scarlet 
Fever occurred among the c iv ilian  population o f the 
Province o f Vicenza £or 17 weeks from October 7th to 
January 31st, although during this period cases were 
notified  among troops in the same area. Further it  
was/
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was noted that during the corresponding months o f the 
previous year cases were always present. Such a long 
absence o f this disease from a population numbering 
roughly h a lf a m illion , appeared very exceptional.
A sim ilar occurrence was seen in Flanders in 1915 
and has also been noted in England (Maidstone 1896 
and Lincoln in 1903). In each case this great ra rity  
o f Scarlet Fever has followed an epidemic of Enteric.
I t  would appear almost as i f  i t  were a case of 
co llective protection against a subsequent disease, 
v iz . Scarlet Fever, by the epidemic prevalence of the 
ea r lie r  disease, v iz . Enteric.
In this connexion and as a matter of interest' J
we worked out s ta tis t ic s  (see TABLE XXIV) re lating  
to a l l  cases o f Scarlet Fever and the Typhoid group 
occurring among B ritish  Troops, with reference to the 
period elapsing in each case between the date of con­
tracting the disease and the date o f Anti-typhoid  
inoculation. The sets o f figures fo r  both these 
diseases appear to be somewhat curiously a like.
TABLE XXV. M E A S L E S.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March A pril May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total
B ritish  Force:Forward Area. 
Mean Strength 78,477 6 5 8 5 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 27
British  Force in Ita ly . 




0 1 1 9 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 17
British  Force in Ita ly .
Taranto. 
(Mediterranean L. of C .)
11 69 17 43 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 0 153
Sixth Ita lian  Army 
(Excluding French and 
B ritish  Troops)
Mean strength 
201,389
13 31 14 2 4 1 4 4 3 76
French Army in Ita ly .
Mean strength 
48,000
6 3 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 16




111 73 80 134 143 108 105 42 13 9 0 2 820
Kingdom of Ita ly
Population
35,000,000
3197 4945 7765 8106 9036 11658 7369 4199 3197 1434 794 1116 62,816
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TABLE XXVI ♦ R U B E L L A •
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total.




0 0 4 6 4 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 25
British Force in Ita ly .  




0 3 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
British Force in Ita ly .
Taranto. 
(Mediterranean L. o f C. )
0 0 1 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 12
Rubella is  not n o tified  in French or Italian Army nor by Ita lia n  C ivilians.
TABLE XXVII. E R Y S I P E L A S .




1 3 4 2 1 0 0 2 0 4 1 0 3 21
British Force in Ita ly .  




0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
British Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Sixth Ita lian  Army. 




mm - - - 25 30 6 4 2 6 1 2 15 91
Erysipelas was not n o tifiab le  by other formations nor by C iv ilians
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M E A S L E S .
No points of epidemiological interest emerged 
apart from the fact that, as was to be expected, 
Taranto with its  considerable percentage of native 
labour troops accounted fo r  nearly a l l  our cases.
R U B E L LA.
This condition was not n o tifiab le  except among 
our own troops.
There is  under this heading nothing of interest 
to note.
E R Y S I P E L A S .
While sporadic cases occurred in a l l  armies and 
in a l l  theatres o f war, at no time did i t  ever assume 
the epidemic proportions o f pre-L isterian  days.
1S1
TABLE XXVIII. M U M P  S.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March A pril May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




4 15 9 18 17 17 9 7 3 2 1 3 6 111
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Base & L. o f C.
Mean strength. 
17,809.
0 1 1 5 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 14
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 6 14 30 49 45 19 14 7 5 53 72 7 5 326
VIth Ita lia n  Army.
Mean strength 
201,389
50 73 26 14 13 9 2 13 22 222
French Army in Ita ly .
Mean strength. 
48,000.
68 42 24 6 9 33 25 5 17 229
Mumps is  not N o tifiab le  among Civilians in Ita ly .
TABLE XXIX. SPIROCHAETOSIS 10 TERO -HAEMORRHAGIC A.
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Forward Area.




M U M P  S.
Ae w ill  be seen from TABLE XXVIII Sporadic 
cases of Mumps occurred the whole year round, but no 
points of aetio log ica l interest emerge from the 
availab le  s ta t is t ic s  as mumps is  not n o tifiab le  among 
c iv ilian s  in Ita ly . The figures fo r the French and 
Ita lia n  troops show more than double the incidence 
there was among our troops fo r  the same period as fa r  
as the forward area is  concerned.
The re la t iv e ly  high incidence at Taranto can 
again probably only be correlated with the large  
number o f native labour companies there -  from coun­
trie s  where they had never before been exposed to 
in fection.
SPIROOHAETOSIS ICTERO-HAEMORRHAGICA.
Only one case of this occurred among the B ritish  
Troops in Ita ly  and i t  was in the forward area.
The French and Ita lian  troops of the Vlth Army reported 
no cases -  a condition of a ffa irs  contrasting favour­
ably with s ta tis tic s  from the Western front where the 
disease occurred in both French and German as well as 
in the B ritish  Armies.
Our immunity in Ita ly  can in a l l  likelihood be 
correlated/
123.
correlated with the comparative absence o f rats in 
the trenches on the Asiago Plateau -  the urine o f rats  
containing the spirochaete being the probable in ­
fective agent according to Japanese workers.
The case-mortality in Europe has never approached 
the 30$ as estimated by the Japanese.
-Wilmaers and Renaux in the Belgian Army found a 
m ortality of only 4$ -  the figure  also quoted by 
McNee fo r  the B ritish  troops on the Western front.
TABLE XXX. A N T H R A X.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
British  Force in Italy- 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
British  Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sixth Ita lian  Army. 




0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
TABLE XXXI. - T E T A N U S .
British  Force in Ita ly .  
Forward Area. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3
British  Force in Ita ly .  
Base & L. o f C. 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
British Force in  Ita ly .  
Taranto. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sixth Ita lia n  Army. - - - 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 8
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A N T H R A X . 
Nothing o f interest to note.
T E T A N US .
As was found, to he the case with most o f the 
belligeren t countries, the incidence of Tetanus showec. 
a very rapid decline in the B ritish  Army a fte r  the 
f i r s t  few months of war, due to improved sanitary 
precautions, more rapid cleansing and dressing of 
wounds, but most particu larly  of course to the use 
o f prophylactic injections of A .T.S. in a l l  wounded.
The cases in TABLE XXXI therefore may be taken 
as a fa i r  average and do not show anything in partic ­
u la r .
Tetanus had, long before 1918,practica lly  lost  
it s  terrors from the m ilitary point of view, though 
the seriousness of i t  in the early days of the war 
should be remembered, e .g .,  Gussmann in an analysis 
of 390 cases in the German Army on the Western front 
states that 61.29$ died as against 38.71$ recovering, 
figures which correspond pretty closely to those 
published by Bruce fo r  the B ritish  Army cases in 1915.
TABLE XXXII. T R A C H O M  A.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
B ritish  B'orce in Ita ly .  
Base & L. o f C.
Mean strength 
17,809.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5
VIth Ita lian  Army.
Mean strength 
201,389.
- - - - 6 1 5 4 7 12 6 5 10 56
Not N o tifiab le  among Civilians.
TABLE XXXIII. MALTA FEVER.




0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
British  Force in Ita ly .  
Base & L. o f C. N il
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
VIth Ita lian  Army. N il
B'rench Army in Ita ly . N il
C ivilians NoH; Noti .f iabl« >.
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T R A C H O M A .
Reference to TABLE XXXII shows that one case 
occurred in our forward area and 5 cases at Taranto.
The Vlth Ita lia n  Army shows 56 cases while the 
French had none. The condition is  not n o tifiab le  
among the c iv ilian  population though a considerable 
amount o f i t  ex ists, more especially  in the south.
MALTA FEVER.
Here again only one case occurred in our forward 
area. As was to be expected a few cases appeared at 
Taranto but only three cases actually arose there^ 
which may be considered very satisfactory .
TABLE XXXIV » CHICKEN POX.
Dec. J an. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
(Forward Area)
Mean strength  
78,477
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B ritish  Force in Ita ly .  
Taranto. 0 1 1 1 9 9 7 9 4 4 6 2 0 53
VIth Ita lia n  Army.
Mean Strength 
201,389.
0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 4 9
Chi cken Pox not notifia 'ble in French \rmy or by Ci v ilian s.
TABLE XXXV. T Y P H U S .
Kingdom of Ita ly .
Population
35,000,000
0 0 2 1
>
12 14 0 2 0 0 0 0 31
There were no cases of Typhus among Ita lians, French or B rit ish  Troops 
and no cases among the C iv il population of Vicenza Province.
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OKIOKEN POX.
A b w ill  be seen from TABLE XXXIV there was 
only one B rit ish  case in our forward area and 9 cases 
in the VIth Ita lian  Army.
As it is not a notifiable disease among the 
civilian population no statistics for them are avail­
able.
The high incidence of 53 at the Taranto Base ia 
almost certain ly due to the re lia t iv e ly  high percent­
age o f native labour contingents there -  probably very 
susceptible because never before exposed to this 
in fection .
TYPHUS FEVER.
The B ritish  Armies in a l l  theatres of War were 
singu larly  lucky in escaping this dreadful scourge 
which to many of the countries engaged in the Great 
War was the most dire in its  resu lts of a l l  the 
epidemic diseases.
Within 6 months o f the outbreak o f v/ar this con­
dition  -  always s ligh t ly  endemic in the Eastern 
countries o f Europe, particu larly  in Russia, Russian
Poland and Galicia -  had lighted up into a blaze and 
the/
the conflagration spread through the Balkans like w ild ­
f i r e .
I t  would appear from a perusal of the continental 
lite ratu re  on the subject that the Russian Armies were 
most often the infecting agents, and wherever large  
numbers o f Russian prisoners o f war were taken -  there 
Typhus broke out.
Petschacher (Wien. med. Wchnschr. 1917. 67) 
reported on its  e ffect in Austria whence i t  was carried  
by Russian prisoners.
In the German Army Emst (Zeitschr. f .  med. Beamte 
1918. 31), Schone (Munch, med. Wchnschr. 1918. 65) and 
Hillenberg (Epidemiologische, K lin, and Serolog. 
Beobachtungen bei F leckfieber, 1918) among others, 
report on various epidemics in parts occupied by the 
Germans. Epidemics in Rumania in 1917 and 1918 were 
described by Kulz (Arch. f .  s c h iffs-u-Tropen Hyg.
1918. 22).
In Serbia too Typhus was responsible fo r  one of 
the darkest hours o f her history (in  1915).
According to Macpherson (Medical History of the 
War) the tota l number of Typhus cases in the B ritish  
Armies in a l l  theatres of war was only 998, of which 
221 were fa ta l.




Theatre of War Cases Deaths M ortality.
France 5 - -
Egypt 366 §0 21.8 $
Mesopotamia 593 135 22.4$
Army of Black Sea 29 6 20.6$
Salonika 5 — PB
In the whole Kingdom of Ita ly  fo r  the year Tinder 
review there were only 31 cases of Typhus with the 
maximum in May and June. These cases a l l  occurred in  
the southern portion o f Ita ly  and there were no cases 
o f Typhus among Ita lia n , B rit ish  or French troops, and 
no cases among the c iv i l  population o f the Province 
o f Vicenza.
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TABLE XXXVI. BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY : FORWARD AREA.
ADMISSIONS FROM ALBUMINURIA & NEPHRITIS : 1918 • 
(Summary of Weekly Returns)












18-21 22-26 27-30 31-34 35-39 40-43 44-47 48-52
5th Albuminuria 25 11 7 Lef*t fo r  Fr•ance. 43
Nephritis 3 5 3 11
41st 
Di vn.-
Albuminuria 34 8 1
Lef‘t fo r Fr’an Q.9.
43
Nephritis 12 7 2 21
7 th 
Divn.
Albuminuria 32 20 10 4 7 2 - 1 1 - - - 77
Nephritis 8 7 6 8 3 2 1 3 1 - - - 39
23rd
Divn.
Albuminuria 20 11 5 2 - 1 mm - 1 — — — 40
Nephritis 3 20 9 5 5 3 1 - - - - - 46
48 th 
Divn.
Albuminuria 16 6 - 1 - - - 1 - - - •- 24
Nephritis 4 4 2 4 6 2 - 1 - 1 1 - 25
Other
Troops
Albuminuria 9 7 2 2 - 2 1 2 - 1 - 1 27
Nephritis 2 6 2 5 6 2 - 2 - tm - 1 26
Totals
Albuminuria 136 63 25 9 7 5 1 4 2 1 - 1 254 3.2
Nephritis 32 49 24 22 20 9 2 6 1 1 1 1 168 2.1
Average Strength (Mean) was 78477
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This condition attracted a great deal o f atten­
tion during the war and a vast amount of work was 
done in connection with i t  and much written about it  
without any very satisfactory conclusions being 
arrived at.
In France up to February 1915 the number of cases 
was not more than one would expect from an equal 
average body of c iv i lian s , but from March 1915 on­
wards and until the end of the war considerable 
numbers of cases occurred.
At f i r s t  considered due to trench l i f e  and 
called 'Trench Nephritis] i t  was la tte r ly  found not 
to be confined to the forward area but occurring on 
the L. of 0. as w ell, and i t  was accordingly named 
"War Nephrit is" .
Prolonged investigations however have fa i le d  to 
prove that i t  d iffered from nephritis o f c iv i l  l i f e ,  
except in degree o f incidence.
Moret (Arch. med. beiges 1917. 70) stated that 
Belgian troops suffered less than the French, and that 
British  soldiers were more affected than those of the 
other a l l i e s .  He la id  stress on fatigue with pro­
duction o f muscle-toxins as a predisposing influence 




a new disease but simply an ordinary nephritis which 
owing to the type of campaign had become extremely 
common among sold iers.
Meyer and Nassau considered that the renal en­
gorgement responsible fo r  orthostatic albuminuria dis­
posed to War nephritis, though i t  was not the actual 
cause.
Goldscheider in a c r it ic a l  analysis of cases 
(Ztschr. f .  phys. u. di&tet. Therap. 1917. 21) found 
that only 5% of a l l  cases had previously had nephritis. 
Older soldiers were more prone to i t  and he formed 
the opinion that the disease was due to infection  
which in the majority of cases was favoured by cold 
and fatigue (the Infantry provided 78% o f the cases 
in his s e r ie s ).  He thought that the infective hypo­
thesis gained support from the fact that small epi­
demics broke out among successive bodies of men drafted 
to a given loca lity .
B rit ish  workers, e.g. MacLean and de Wesselow 
and others have worked along the same lines and while 
an infective hypothesis was often mooted they held 
that the infection was not a specific  one but might 
be that o f bronchitis, influenza or trench fever etc., 
as nephritis is  such a frequent complication of many 
infections even o f a t r iv ia l  in i t ia l  i l ln ess .





The TABLE XXXVI shows the admissions for  
albuminuria and nephritis by quarters and is  compiled 
from the weekly returns re this condition which had 
to be rendered by a l l  medical units.
Cases returned as Nephritis showed evid.ences of  
blood as well as of albumin in the urine. I t  w i l l  
be seen from the table that^ for the f i r s t  quarter 
while we had f ive  divisions in the force -  a l l  straight 
from active and arduous operations on the Western 
front -  the number o f cases was considerable.
By April there was a very marked diminution and in the
fourth quarter there were only 2 cases of albuminuria
■
and 3 of nephritis.
In fact from the point o f view of Nephritis it  
would appear that the Ita lian  front was almost a 
health resort fo r  our troops!
TABLE XXXVII. SMALL POX.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.




0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Brit ish  Force in Ita ly  




0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
British  Force in I ta ly .  
Taranto. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sixth Ita lian  Army, 




- - - 9 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 16
French Army in Ita ly .
Mean strength 
48,000
- - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Province o f Vicenza.
Population
500,000
- 16 14 32 21 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 91
Kingdom of I ta ly .
Population
35,000,000




shows that there were only two cases o f small-pox 
in the B rit ish  Forces in Ita ly  -  one case occurring 
in January on the L. of C. and one case in the forward 
area in April in the midst of a small epidemic in our 
b i l le t in g  area.
There were no cases in the French Armŷ  but 16 in 
the VIth Ita lian  Army.
The Province o f Vicenza shows 91 cases for the 
year while the total number o f cases in the Kingdom 
of Ita ly  for 1918 was 4080.
Smallpox is  of course endemic in Ita ly ,  more 
particu larly  in the v ic in ity  of Naples and in the 
south.
In the f i r s t  quarter o f the year quite a few cases, 
as can be seen, occurred in Vicenza Province -  
practica lly  a l l  being confined to a few villages  in 
one of our b i l le t in g  areas.
The result shows what firm administrative measures 
can achieve. The immediate vaccination of a l l  British  
o fficers  and men was ordered and^as vaccination is  
compulsory in our Armŷ  there was no d if f icu lty  in 
rapidly carrying out this measure.
We also kept a very watchful eye -  to them no 
doubt often an unpleasantly watchful eye -  on the 
civ ilian/
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c iv i l ian  population. And that i t  was very necessary 
soon appeared obvious* In one house v is ited , with 
small pox patients, the p laster of one wall was noticed 
to be deficient -  one could see through to the next 
building, a small general store from which our troops 
as well as the local inhabitants bought goods.
We even found that people in infected houses who 
had been quarantined saw no harm in writing and post­
ing letters  to re latives and friends in other parts.
In fact observation o f this small c iv il ian  
epidemic only served to make i t  appear providential 
that i t  did not assume much larger proportions.
The only theatres of war in which there was any 
degree o f prevalence o f small-pox were Egypt, Palestine 
and Mesopotamia. On the French front the British  
Armies had only eleven cases o f small-pox during the 
whole war.
One must regard these figures as very sa t is ­
factory -  more so i f  one takes into account the fact  
that Germany, proverbially  the best vaccinated of 
countries, did not entirely escape. As a result of 
the entry' into East Prussia o f Wolhynian refugees 
carrying small-pox in 1916 there were outbreaks in 
various places in North and West Germany, e.g.
Paschen (Deutsche, med. Wchnschr. 1918. 44) described 




Kirchner (Ztschr. f .  â r tz l .  Fortbild . 1918*15) 
reported that there were 400 oases in Berlin in 1917 
with 40 deaths and estimated that there would be 
approximately 4000 cases fo r the whole of Germany.
Indeed von Rembold (Deutsche, med. Wchnschr.
1917» 43) held that the epidemic in North Germany 
was larger than any since 1870 and affected chiefly  
those engaged in war-work and usually elderly people 
with immunity through vaccination much diminished.
In a few cases vaccination evidently fa i led  to 
confer immunity and some German soldiers vaccinated in 
January had a mild attack in February and the same 
sequence was noted in a  nursing s is te r  in Germany.
TABLE XXXVIII. I N F L U E N ZA.
Dec. Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept . Oct. Nov. Dec. Total s .
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Kingdom of  
Ita ly . Not Not i f ia b le •
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TABLE XXXIX- BRITISH FORCE IN ITALY (ASIAflO FRONT).
1 Dec. J an • Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Tota l.
Average Strength. 102,183 113,759 113,233 93,050 71,193 71,642 68,707 67,547 67,500 65,286 63,284 62,623 60,192 78,477(Mean)
Influenza
Without Complications ? 100 Ï  40 ? 19 98 2 188 4252 125 102 257 1608 1009 377 8,177
With "
(severe respiratory) ? ? - 4 0 5 301 20 29 81 1937 721 237 3,337
Total 100 40 19 102 2 193 4553 145 131 338 3547 1730 614 11,514
Deaths - - - - - 3 11 1 1 3 249 173 40 481
Case Mortality fo - - - - - 1.5 0.24 0.7 0.7 0.9 7.0 10.0 6.5 4.18
Incidence per 1000 
average strength 0.98 0.35 0.17 1.1 0.03 2.69 66.27 2.1 1.9 5.2 5.6 27.6 10.2 146.7 )§ o
Mortality per 1000 
average strength - - - - - 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.04 3.9 2.76 0.66 6.1 ) * "
SIXTH ITALIAN ARMY (ASIAGO FRONT ).




Without Complications - -
©rH “ ■Q - - 7773 3248 86 330 1171 6010 1949 1420 21987
With "
(severe respiratory) _ _
03 1—1 •H 1074 250 34 120 370 1070 495 369 3782
Total - - <0 _ > - ~ 8847 3498 120 450 1541 7080 2444 1789 25769
Deaths < - - - - 12 80 506 300 179 1077
Case Mortality % -P - - - - 2.6 5.1 7.1 12.2 10 4.1
Incidence per 1000 
average strength.
o» - 43.34 17.83 0.58 2.21 7.51 35.9 11.41 9.1 191.94 )s3J _ . . . .
Mortality " « « . . - - 0.05 0.38 2.53 1.39 0.94 8.01 ) | 4
FRENCH FORCE IN ITALY (ISIAGO FRONT)




© ï—ï 39 3
394 4 96 627 1218 286 425 3443
With M ' ' P  .....crt - 129 383 145 48 705
Totals rH•H - 393 394 4 96 756 1601 431 473 4148
Deaths ai - 4 40 118 31 32 225
Case-Mortalitv c - 4 5.3 7.4 7.2 6.7 5.0




8 6  .4) 3  31 
\ a  ©
É3 4 .7 )| h3
PROVINCE OF VICENZA.
Influenza Cases N.B. Notification  of Influenza 33554 10592 2915 47061
Deaths onlv became obligatory here "7TT n 123' 1196
Case-Mortality % in October. — '2"n S.-4 4.-3“ "■ -  S.K 1 .
Incidence per 1000 V 84.12
Mortalitv per 1000 2.4
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I N F L U E N Z A .
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Italjr in common with other European countries 
during the period in question, suffered severely from 
the pandemic of Influenza which in 1918 assumed such 
alarming proportions over such a wide area.
And along with the rest of humanity in Ita ly  the 
troops of a l l  nations there suffered very considerably.
As elsewhere we experienced two distinct waves.
The ea r lie r  wave o f comparatively ligh t cases com­
menced suddenly in March and the maximal incidence 
occurred in June: the second wave of more serious 
cases began towards the end of September and reached 
its  maximal intensity during October.
At the beginning of the second wavs we formed the 
opinion that most of the cases were occurring among 
men who had escaped the f i r s t  wave, but subsequent 
experience did not tend to confirm this. Indeed it  
transpired that while certain units which suffered  
during the f i r s t  and lighter wave of the epidemic 
appeared to escape the second wave almost completely, 
in the case of other units i t  was shown that every 
individual attacked ligh t ly  during the summer suffered  
again severely during the autumn, and that no appreci­
able/
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appreciable measure o f protection seemed to be afforded 
against a severe type by a prior ligh t type.
At this distance of time it  appears somewhat 
extraordinary, in view of its  known epidemic cycle, 
that we did not instantly recognise the condition; but 
i t  must be admitted that the f i r s t  wave of wthree day 
fever” found us at a loss for a diagnosis. A consider­
able body of opinion in Ita ly  considered that i t  was 
sand-fly  fever, which Indeed i t  somewhat resembled, 
and curiously enough the same opinion seems to have 
been formed in Mesopotamia at the commencement of the 
outbreak there.
Then, when reports came pouring in from other 
countries and theatres of war, i t  was referred to as 
”Spanish Influenza” just as in Germany it  appears to 
have been called "Morbus Ibericus” . Hanssen of Kiel 
(Deutsch. med. Wchnschr. 1918. 44) states that he 
found records o f a ”Spanish Sickness" as fa r  back as 
the years 1586, 1580 and 1592 -  a l l  rapidly spreading 
and claiming many victims: while in the epidemic of 
1889-90 there were 55,263 cases in the German Army.
The general opinion was that the course of the 
epidemic seemed to be from west to east: i t  prevailed  
in America in 1917 and appeared on an epidemic scale 
in Spain in May 1918 whence i t  invaded France, Ita ly  
and Germany and greatly weakened the effective strength 
of a l l  armies.
Ginns/
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Ginns (Mftnch. med. Wchnschr. 1918. 65) on the 
other hand, considered that i t  was brought to England 
in the f i r s t  place from China and did not arise in 
Spain.
INCIDENCE AND EFFECT IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES.
In the United Kingdom Influenza was never absent 
during the War: in 1916 and 1917 the incidence among 
the military population alone was 36,072 and 28,980 
respectively.
In 1918 the figures remained about normal t i l l  
June when there was a sudden increase from the usual 
average monthly rate of about 3,000 to 31,138? the 
increase was maintained in July but dropped again in 
August, only to r ise  once more in October and November. 
While December and January were f a i r ly  average, there 
was a further r ise  in February 1919.
The same sequence was noted in France and that 
same curve with three waves in June and November 1918 
and February 1919 was reproduced fo r the c iv i lian  
populations of the respective countries.
In Germany the results were the same, and here too 
the second wave was of the Pneumonic type: according 
to Weber (Berl. k lin . Wchnschr. 1919» 56) there were 
in Berlin  alone in October 1918, 2770 deaths from 
Influenza and Pneumonia.
B&hm/
Bohm (Wien. med. Wchnschr. 1918. 68) notes that 
out of the normal population of Vienna (2,200,000) 
the deaths from Influenza and Pneumonia, which in 
normal times average 40 to 50 per week out of 700 to 
800 deaths from a l l  causes, rose during the height of 
the f i r s t  epidemic wave to 123 while in the second 
wave, at its  height in October, they rose to 1,468 per 
week.
Generally speaking, on the continent the weekly 
deaths in October rose to at least three times the 
usual average.
In Ita ly  Morelli (Po lic l in . 1918. 25) noted the 
same curves which are shown in the tables herewith, 
and stated that, while the f i r s t  cases were mild, the 
epidemic increased in severity -  so much so that 
Pavesi (Po lic lin . 1918. 25) cites as instances some 
I ta lian  Divisions with a sick rate of 90$ actually.
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS.
TABLE XXXVIII 
shows the number of cases with deaths and case mort­
a l ity  occurring in each month in our Forward Area and 
Base and L. of C., in the Ita lian  and French troops of 
the same Army and among the c iv ilians o f the Province 
of Vicenza.
For our Base and L. o f C. the figures are in­
complete/
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incomplete as notification  fo r Influenza only came into 
force in September.
In Vicenza province notification  only became 
compulsory in October while for the rest of the Kingdom 
of Ita ly  no figures are available, unfortunately, as i t  
was not made notifiab le  at a l l .
I t  w i l l  be noted that the two waves are shown 
very d istinctly , but whereas in the B rit ish  and Ita lian  
troops the crest of the f i r s t  wave in June and May 
respectively is  higher than the crest of the second 
wave, the opposite held good among the French troops. 
But the case mortality of the second wave was very 
much higher among a l l .
Out of 4553 cases in our troops in June there
were only 11 deaths while in 3547 cases in October
there were 249 deaths.
The Oase Mortality for October was much the same 
fo r a l l  the troops, i .^ .  7$ fo r the B ritish , 7.1$ for  
the Ita lians and 7.4$ for the French.
For the whole period the case mortality among the
troops was from 4.18$ (B rit ish ) to 5$ French: which 
compares quite favorably with the average case mort­
a l ity  of this epidemic throughout the world which has 
been estimated at 5$ to 10$.
TABLE XXXIX./
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shows the same figures as above, but in addition a sub 
division of oases into
(a ) those without complications
(b ) those with severe respiratory complications.
The deaths, case mortality per cent, incidence per 
1000 average strength and mortality per 1000 average 
strength are also shown.
As regards case mortality among B rit ish  Troops, 
the highest was registered in November, v iz . 10$: 
the highest recorded by the Ita lians  was 12.2$, also 
in November. The French highest was only 7.4$ but as 
theirs were more constant their tota l case mortality  
was a fter  a l l  the highest of the three.
Disregarding the figures fo r the c iv i l ian  
population of Vicenza, which are too small fo r any 
conclusions to be drawn, the figures may be convenient 
ly  summarized as fo llow s : -
Incidence Mortality  
Case M orta lity , per 1000. per 1000.
Ita lian  4.1$ 191.94 8.01
French 5.0$ 86.4 4.7
British  4.18$ 146.7 6.1
When one looks back one can only fee l relieved that 
the mortality among our troops was not greater, fo r  i t  
should be noted that i t  so chanced that we were on the 




In June, when the epidemic was at its  height for the 
f i r s t  time, we were heavily attacked on the Asiago 
Plateau by the Austrians^ but held our ground and had 
neither to advance nor retreat, so that our hospital 
administration was in no way disorganised.
It  was a very d ifferent story in October to 
November fo r  i t  was on 24th October after forced and 
exhausting marches, carried out secretly and with a 
consequent minimum of preparation, that we launched 
our f in a l attack which compelled Austria to sue fo r  an 
armistice.
These operations lasted from 24th October to 4th 
November and were carried out under conditions of 
well nigh maximum hardship. We had to force a passage 
across the Piave r ive r , at that point one and a ha lf  
miles broad and consisting of numerous channels dotted 
with islands. Owing to the strong current, enemy 
sh e l l - f ire ,  and enemy bombing planes^our pontoon bridges 
were repeatedly broken and numerous men were drowned 
in the crossing: many of the shallower channels had 
to be forded, and as a result dry feet and dry clothing 
were, I imagine, unknown. The in i t ia l  resistance 
overcome, the enemy made a last  stand on the river  
Monticano and when we forced this on the night 29th -  
30th October their defeat, as Lord Cavan said in the 
o f f i c ia l  dispatch, "became a rout".
I t  has been said and said truly that there is
only/
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only on© sight as te rr ib le  as that of an army in retreat  
and that is  an army advancing. As we pushed forward 
i t  was to find a devastated and despoiled country with 
not a thing le f t  to eat. Everywhere we found starving 
and sick c iv i lian s , starving Austrian wounded and sick 
l e f t  behind in the retreat -  everywhere starvation and 
death.
Our troops, as they got further from the river,  
found rations grow more and more scanty because i t  
was not t i l l  weeks la te r  that bridges of any size 
could be constructed across the wide Piave r iver .
Indeed bully  beef, b iscu its , cheese and tea were our 
staple diet. In other words, the wonder is  that our 
mortality from Influenza was not much greater, fo r the 
troops were wet> exhausted, monotonously fed and sur­
rounded with sickness, poverty and death among c iv ilians  
and Austrians.
To make the point clearer s t i l l ,  I may be pardoned 
citing a personal experience as evidence of the ad­
verse factors surrounding us.
Our f in a l objective was Sacile -  a v i l la ge  on the 
Livenza r iver , and when I entered i t  an hour or so 
after  we had driven out the Austrian rear-guard.,1 at 
once proceeded to take over two Austrian hospitals  
there. Only a few patients were s t i l l  a live  and none 
had had any food for several days as hospital sta ffs
t
with a l l  food  had joined the retreat.
In/
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In one hospital o f about 150 beds^ I found over 
90 corpses -  some dead in bed, others lying dead under 
their beds where they had crawled in fear o f our f in a l  
trench-mortar bombardment against the enemy rear-guard. 
Most of these I judged to be deaths from Influenza and 
when I got a party of local c iv ilians to carry them out 
I found the mortuary already quite fu l l  o f decomposing 
bodies which the Austrians had evidently not had time 
to bury.
Three days la te r  when the Armistice was signed.,I 
myself was carried back to that same hospital -  as a 
patient -  also with Influenza.
Undoubtedly I think we had reason to be thankful 
fo r the fact that the mortality in October -  November 
kept as low as i t  did, considering a l l  the adverse 
factors to be contended with.
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SUMMARY OF PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES.
In the course of this thesis an attempt has been 
made to draw attention to the great d i f f ic u lt ie s  en­
countered in modern warfare, waged under modern con­
ditions, in attempting to eradicate or keep within 
bounds the incidence o f epidemic and preventible 
disease.
Repeated reference has been made to the conditions 
existing in the particu lar "zona di guerra" in Ita ly  
in which we were operating -  crowded with troops of 
different nations as well as with its  normal in­
habitants reinforced by hordes of refugees -  this 
whole teeming population compressed into an area 
where modern sanitary methods were p ractica lly  unknown
In dealing with this situation from the adminis­
trative medical point of view, where the crowded 
inhabitants might almost be compared to a great mass 
of combustible material only awaiting an incendiary 
spark to burst into conflagration, certain prophylacti< 
measures, medical and administrative, clearly  emerged, 
and may now conveniently be summarized.
A . MEASURES TO CONTROL THE ITALIAN CIVILIANS IN
THE AREA.
This was in our opinion one of the most important 
items/
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items, i f  not the most important indeed on the pro­
gramme* I t  required a considerable amount of tact 
and sometimes tactfu l firmness on the part of a l l  
ranks and branches of the service to impress con­
tinually  on the c iv i lian s , by example and precept, the 
necessity for modern sanitary measures in fighting  
communicable disease.
Thanks to the system of in ter-notification  of 
infectious disease which we in itiated  with the Ita lian  
medical authorities, we were not only kept aware of 
such cases as were reported but were able to follow  
them up and take such measures as were deemed advis­
able and practicable to safeguard our own troops.
Under thi3 heading are included the removal of our 
troops from infected b i l le t s  and the putting out of 
bounds to B rit ish  Troops infected houses, shops or 
v illages .
Further i t  was largely  due to our representations 
that an attempt was made to provide adequate hospital 
accommodation fo r  c iv i l ian  cases.
We also encouraged them to come to us fo r  help, 
and wherever possible we did help them -  in removing 
cases to hospital, d isinfecting premises, supplying 
disinfectants and even sanitary f it t in g s ,  etc.
B./
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B. MEASURES WITH REFERENCE TO ALLIED TROOPS.
Immediately on our a rr iva l in Ita ly  every 
effo rt  was made to establish a particu larly  close 
"medical entente" with the Ita lian  and French Troops 
with whom we were operating. In addition to the 
interchange of infectious disease notifications, we did 
our best to encourage free discussion o f d i f f icu lt ie s  
met with and results obtained« Not only in the heat 
o f battle  when we treated their wounded alike with 
our own, but also in the more peaceful paths o f pre­
ventive medicine our relations with our neighbours 
were uniformly cordial.
Reference has already been made to the endeavour 
we made to standardize terminology in dealing with the 
epidemic o f diarrhoeal diseases -  in the hope that we 
might produce s ta t is t ics  which, would be comparable and 
so mutually helpful.
0. MEASURES AMONG OUR OWN TROOPS.
1. Insistence on a high standard o f Sanitation in
a l l  un its .
A l l  our administration aimed at producing and 
maintaining a high standard of sanitation in a l l  
units.
In this connection the work o f the Sanitary 
Sections was o f paramount importance and although 
each/
each unit was self-supporting in this respect, the 
continuous patro lling  of the area by the sanitary 
sections fo r the discovery and rec tif icat ion  of 
nuisances helped materially in preserving a high 
standard.
Under this heading are included disinfection  
and cleanliness of b i l le t s ,  cook-houses, food- 
stores, mess-rooms, baths and ablution places, 
la tr ines , incinerators, horse lines and manure- 
dumps.
Provision of laundries and disinfecting  
stations fo r  dealing with the louse problem had 
also to receive due attention.
Food inspection.
Dietary wag closely supervised and, during 
the summer when fru it  was suspected as a sub­
sidiary cause of diarrhoea, an endeavour was made 
to lim it the quantity consumed and to ensure that 
i t  was of good quality and clean.
Food stores were r ig id ly  inspected and as 
fa r  as possible were made f ly -p roo f and dust-proof.
Cook-houses and the personnel thereof were 
very closely supervised and every endeavour was 
made to exclude possible "carriers '*.
Troops were encouraged to wash,their hands 
before meals and to keep their eating utensils  
thoroughly clean.
Water d isc ip line .
Although, as has heen pointed out, the water 
supplies were as a rule above suspicion, the usual 
method of chlorination was insisted upon and 
regular inspections of water-carts were carried  
out by the water personnel of the Sanitary Sections. 
A ll  sources of water supply were regularly tested 
both chemically and bacter io log ica lly .
Hospitalisation.
The setting aside of special hospitals for  
special cases or groups of cases, e.g. diarrhoea- 
dysentery, was also a most important administrative 
measure. The consequent centralization economised 
s ta f f  and materials, and in this connection the 
sit ing  of the bacterio logical laboratory at the 
special hospital helped us s t i l l  further in ob­
taining rapid and re la t ive ly  re liab le  resu lts.
Prophylactic Inoculation and Vaccination.
Under this heading we may include Vaccination 
against Smallpox, Anti-typhoid Inoculation with 
T.A.B. and the prophylactic injection of Anti- 
tetanic serum (A .T .S .) in a l l  wounds and in ju ries .
In I ta ly ,  as fa r  as I am aware, no work was done 
on any big  scale on prophylactic injections  




But the results obtained by this measure in 
the conditions fo r  which i t  has been adapted and 
proved, point c learly  to the fact that in the 
perfecting of this process and its  extension to 
include other epidemic diseases l ie s  the future 
hope of preventive medicine from the military point 
of view.
